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Abstract 
In this study, a framework to model the effects of stress 
on a process control operator is proposed. There exists 
many cognitive models, each of which attempts to model a 
specific class of human behaviour. One major effect of 
stress is the cause of errors, both physical and cognitive. 
In order to model the effects of stress, two cognitive 
models, a cognitive model of human errors and a cognitive 
model of process control operators are examined in detail. 
In this thesis, the basic functions of the human cognitive 
system, its organization and a cognitive model of error 
commission are first examined. The behaviour of a process 
control operator and a cognitive model of the behaviour of 
the operator are then discussed. 
The known effects of stress on the process control 
operator's behaviour are described and a framework for 
modelling the behaviour of process control operators under 
stress is proposed. The inadequacies associated with 
existing cognitive models for process control operators are 
explained and a modified cognitive model is proposed, which 
takes into account the cognitive model of error. 
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Finally, an architecture design for the implementation of 
the cognitive model is provided and suggestions for the 
next step forward are proposed. 
5 
List of Abbreviations and Symbols Used 
Abbreviations 
CC = Control Centre 
HRA = Human Reliability Approach 
HEP = Human Error Probability 
IF = Importance Factor 
KB = Knowledge-based Behaviour Mode 
SF = Spatial Factor 
SR-B = Skill/Rule-based Behaviour Mode 
PSF = Probability Shaping Factors 
VF = Visual Dominance Factor 
WM = Working Memory 
Symbols 
n 
P = Probability for indicator i to be registered by 
i 
the operator at any given time, when the operator 
is operating in normal mode 
a 
P = Probability for indicator i to be registered by 
i 
the operator at any given time, when the operator 
is operating in abnormal mode 
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r 
P = Probability for indicator i to be registered by 
i 
the operator at any given time, in random 
monitoring mode 
1 
d 
P = Probability for indicator i to be registered by 
i 
the operator at any given time in directed 
subconscious monitoring mode 
2 
d 
P = Probability for indicator i to be registered by 
i 
the operator at any given time in directed 
conscious monitoring mode 
V = Visual dominance of indicator i 
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S = Spatial factor of indicator i 
i 
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i 
2 
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r = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
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= Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in normal mode 
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1. Introduction 
Human beings have become important components in many 
----------------
complex technical systems and in many cases the failure 
of such human components will lead to disastrous effects. 
The consequences of such human unreliability are well 
demonstrated and in accidents such as Three Mile Islands 
(1,5), Chernobyl (2) and the Zeebrugge ferry disasters. 
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the need to consider the 
human-system interaction has increased with the adoption 
of automatic systems in which the operator is assigned 
the role of a supervisor. 
As human beings are animals of emotions, their behaviour 
can be very different when they are under stress. In a 
system in which a human operator is an important 
component, it is often desirable to know the behaviour of 
the operator under stressful operating conditions. 
Although component reliability and hence system 
reliability can be assessed with a fair degree of 
accuracy, human components were generally considered to 
be fault free and this is obviously not the case. When 
the human operator does make a mistake, the result is 
very often spectacular because these faults were not 
taken into consideration when the system was designed. 
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1.1 Review of Approaches to Human Reliability Assessment 
Human Reliability is very difficult to quantify simply 
because the nature of the failure modes is not 
quantifiable. There are mainly two ways for human errors 
to occur. They are errors in judgement or "decision"" 
errors and the misrepresentation of intention or "action" 
errors. Various methods for assessing component 
reliability techniques have been applied to the human 
reliability assessment (3,4,49,50) with varying degrees 
of success (8). This approach is generally referred to as 
the engineering approach. 
The other major approach is the cognitive approach. This 
approach stems from the belief that an accurate 
description of the behaviour of a human operator based on 
cognitive modelling is required to achieve a good 
understanding of human errors. 
1.1.1 The Engineering Approach 
In the engineering approach the human operator is treated 
as a component with limited capacities in a number of 
well-defined categories, such as attention span, response 
time and accuracy etc. Erroneous actions are attributed 
to the inherent variability of human performance, 
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fluctuations in performance capacity, information 
overflows and stress. The major drawback of the 
engineering approach is that the internal cognitive 
functions which determine behaviour, such as reasoning 
and planning are not considered, although these functions 
play an important role in "decision" errors. The 
importance of such decision errors is best summed up in 
the famous Kemeny report on the Three Mile Island 
accident (5): 
"The operating staff made wrong decisions, 
intervened incorrectly and failed to perform the 
required operations, all of which caused a minor 
operating fault to become the TMI-2 accident". 
1.1.2 The cognitive Approach 
Failure modes of the human component are not well behaved 
and therefore cannot always be foreseen. In order to 
capture the "unpredictability", some sort of cognitive 
model should be included in the assessment of the total 
system reliability. The reliability of a system in which 
human beings play an important part can then be studied 
by representing the operator with a computer program, 
constructed according to the known cognitive models 
developed. 
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The cognitive approach to human reliability is based on 
the explicit use of models or theories of the cognitive 
functions that constitute the sUbstratum of human 
behaviour. It is believed that cognitive models can be 
used: 
"to produce the same data about human error 
rates that were sought by the engineering models 
but are in addition applicable for other 
purposes, such as predictions, dynamic 
simulation, sensitivity analyses, performance 
monitoring, design guidance, specification of 
error reduction strategies etc." (6). 
See Note 
The cognitive approach adopts a theory or model of the 
operator's cognitive functions. By its definition, a 
model is only a simplistic representation of the real 
system and cannot possibly include all parts of the 
system. The choice of the items to be modelled depends on 
the intended use of the model and even then the system 
can still be modelled from different viewpoints, with 
different emphasis. The validity of any cognitive model 
and its usefulness will be determined by the purpose of 
the modelling. 
Engineers, due to the nature of their training and work, 
are more used to accepting models on "face values", 
whereas psychologists spent much of their training 
learning how to test the validity of what looks 
Note: I must stress that engineering models have been successfully used in many system engineering for all the 
purposes described above. 
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superficially like convincing explanations of human 
behaviour (7). Therefore a satisfactory cognitive model 
in the eyes of an engineer may not necessarily satisfy a 
psychologist's criteria for a successful model. Various 
cognitive models already exist and the emphasis of 
different models is very often different. A Cognitive 
model which sought to explain human errors or absent 
mindedness mistakes was proposed by James Reason (10,15). 
This model is concerned with ordinary human mistakes. A 
cognitive model used to explain the behaviour of process 
control operators was proposed by J. Rasmussen(9). 
Although both models can be used to model human 
behaviour, they are essentially separate models and there 
is at present no single cognitive model which seeks to 
explain human errors within the context of process 
control operations. 
Attempts at computer simulations of the behaviour of a 
process control operator by Cacciabue et al have produced 
mixed results (16,17). On the one hand, Cacciabue's group 
has been able to model the normal behaviour of the 
operator. The cognitive model used by Cacciabue et al is 
Reason's model of generic human errors, which is geared 
towards the simulation of general human errors. Reason's 
model did not explicitly model the three different modes 
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of behaviour, Skill-based, Rule-based and Knowledge-based 
behaviours, particular to process control operators. 
The limitation of the above model is its inability to 
model the cognitive errors observed in different modes of 
behaviour of a process control operator. Although the 
model used by Cacciabue can simulate some human errors, 
it is felt that the model's inability to model the three 
observed modes of process control operator behaviour 
casts doubts on the accuracies of the simulation's 
predictions. It is felt that a cognitive model which can 
account for the three modes of behaviour observed in the 
operators should be used and then the model should be 
extended to include the modelling of generic human 
errors. 
1.1.3 The Effects of stress on Human Reliability 
There are many factors that can affect the reliability of 
an operator. One of these factors is stress. Since an 
erroneous plan of actions devised by the operator will 
affect the system most, the effects of stress on the 
cognitive processes of the operators are of particular 
interest. 
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The literature on the psychological effects of stress on 
the operators of a process control plant is mainly 
qualitative and attempts to produce quantitative results 
have not been wholly successful (3,8,49,50). The 
qualitative findings can only provide broad answers to 
the question of how stress affects the operator, but in 
themselves are not sufficient to produce situation 
specific recommendations. 
1.2 objectives and Approach of This Work 
The main motivation behind this work is the need to 
produce a formal framework for the evaluation of the 
reliability of the system when the operator is affected 
by stress. A computer simulation, built to cognitive 
specifications can then be constructed and it can be used 
as a tool when interfaced with a plant simulator, to 
study the overall system reliability. 
There are many problems associated with such an attempt 
to develop a simulation of the behaviour of the operator. 
First of all, a cognitive model that can account for the 
different modes of behaviour, including human errors, 
must be developed. Second there is a need to define the 
modes of interaction between stress and the operator's 
cognitive abilities. Third, the effects of stress on the 
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cognitive processes of the operator must be identified. 
Fourth, the representation and modellinq of errors, both 
action and cognitive errors and the effects of stress 
must be addressed and finally, a computer program 
architecture which will support the above modelling 
methodology needs to be developed. Here the dominant 
cognitive approach, which classifies the behaviour and 
actions of a process control plant operator into three 
categories: skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based 
behaviour (18) is adopted. 
This work aims to model the cognitive behaviour of the 
operator and no attempt was made to address the issues of 
scheduling or planning within the artificial intelligence 
context. The scheduling and planning methods used should 
be those described by the operators and the efficiency of 
these methods are not important for the purpose of this 
study. 
In this study, the effects of stress on the behaviour of 
the process control operator were identified. A framework 
for modelling these effects and human errors, both Action 
and cognitive was developed. The modelling methodology 
developed is relatively independent of the cognitive 
models used. A new cognitive model capable of modelling 
the three modes of operator behaviour is proposed and is 
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later extended to enable human errors to be modelled. The 
model implicitly supports the modelling of the effects of 
stress and methods for this extension are described. 
A computer architecture that supports the implementation 
of the new cognitive model is proposed. The architecture 
is based on the blackboard architecture (27,42) but 
differs from the architecture used by Cacciabue et ale 
The proposed architecture closely reflects the cognitive 
processing functions performed by the process control 
operator and this architecture also reflects the current 
understanding of the mechanisms behind various cognitive 
functions. The architecture proposed did not take into 
account the processing efficiency of the implemented 
model. 
The rating of stress levels experienced by the operator 
is a problematic one since the feeling of stress is a 
subjective one. A psychologically based rating method 
(29) is identified to be useful in the assignment of 
stress levels to different plant states. 
1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
In chapter 2, the cognitive system is described and the 
nature of the operator behaviour is examined in detail. 
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In chapter 3, the major causes of human errors and their 
relations to the cognitive system as described by Reason 
and Mycielska (10) will be discussed. In chapter 4, the 
effects of stress on the operator and in particular his 
cognitive processing abilities will be described and 
examined closely. A framework for modelling the effects 
of stress and errors is also proposed in chapter 4. 
This proposed modelling method is at this stage 
independent of the cognitive models used. The underlying 
assumption taken by the model is that the ultimate 
function of the cognitive system/operator is to make 
decisions. This assumption treats various cognitive 
activities eg. diagnosis and planning as decision making. 
In chapter 5, an existing cognitive model and its 
implementation (16,17) is examined and the inadequacies 
of this model are discussed. A new cognitive model is 
proposed also in this chapter and its advantages over the 
other model are discussed. 
In chapter 6, the modelling framework proposed in chapter 
4 is applied to the new cognitive model. In chapter 7, a 
software architecture design, together with a software 
package which supports the implementation of the two 
proposed recognition methods is given and explained in 
18 
detail. Finally, chapter 8 provides a conclusion to this 
work and suggestions for the next step forward are made. 
In appendix A, a psychological rating method which can be 
used to obtain the stress levels associated with 
different plant operation states is described in detail. 
In appendix B, the code of the software package which 
allows the fast translation of the knowledge involved in 
recognition into computer code is listed. The manual of 
using this package is also included here for 
completeness. 
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2. The Nature of the Behaviour of A Process Control 
Operator 
2.1 Introduction 
Nowadays, the control of a process plant is highly 
automated. Under normal operating conditions, the role of 
the operator is mainly supervisory and at most will only 
carry out instructions as dictated in the operating 
manual. These required procedures are well rehearsed and 
practised. As a result, this type of routine action is 
almost automatic and requires little or no active 
thinking by the operator. 
Under normal circumstances, the operator of any technical 
system will most likely perform the required actions as 
laid down in an instruction manual. Assuming that the 
manual is well written and correct, there may still be a 
finite chance that the operator will still commit an 
. error. This may be.due to the omission of a certain 
action as requested in the manual .pr an erroneous action 
was performed instead of the required one. These "Action" 
errors (as oppose to "Decision" errors mentioned in 
chapter 1) appear to be random in nature and yet no 
satisfactory way exists for the prediction of this type 
of error. In addition, the consequences of this type of 
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error are dependent on the precise context in which they 
occurred. 
In an abnormal operating situation, the main task of the 
operator is to change the system from an undesirable 
state to a desirable one. The operator will need to 
identify the current state and decide on a desired state 
to which the system should be changed. In order to 
achieve this desired state, the operator must devise a 
series of actions that will cause the system to reach the 
desired state. 
Before this final state is reached, a series of 
intermediate states may be traversed on the way. The 
precise path of this transition may be crucial because 
the operator must ensure that no unsafe state is 
traversed on the path and that all operating constraints 
are observed. 
It must be clear that many possibilities for error exist 
both in normal and abnormal operating conditions. In 
order to understand the nature and causes of these 
errors, an appreciation of how the cognitive system is 
organized and its basic functions is needed; in addition 
an understanding of the different types of errors that 
can be committed by human beings is required. This is 
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particularly true for "Action" errors which have a common 
occurrence in daily life. 
2.2 The cognitive system 
The human mind is a highly organized system. It can be 
separated into four sUb-systems according to their 
relative functions (10) (Figure 2.1): 
- Intention system 
- Memory system 
- Various Pandemoniums (abode of demons) 
- Action system 
2.2.1 Intention and Action systems 
The Intention system is where intentions are formed. It 
is not very clear how this is achieved but since this 
study is more concerned about what intentions are formed 
and how they are carried out, the Intention system will 
not be considered in detail here (10). The Action system 
facilitates the movement of the body and will carry out 
the actions intended (Figure 2.2). 
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2.2.2 Memory System 
The Memory system (Figure 2.3) is made up of four 
distinct stores: 
Intention store 
- Word store 
- Action store 
- Recognition store 
The Intention store is a temporal extension of the 
Intention system. When an intention is produced in the 
Intention system, this intention is passed into the 
Intention store. The content of the Intention store is 
short-lived and is subject to loss or interference. For 
an intention to remain in the Intention store for any 
length of time, it has to be constantly refreshed. 
2.2.3 Pandemonium 
The Pandemonium is the location where all demons, both 
cognitive and action, reside (Figure 2.4). Cognitive 
demons are centres of control. They are in general opaque 
to the consciousness, i.e., the "self" is not aware of 
the way the demons achieve control. There are various 
types of cognitive demons, each controls a particular 
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Figure 2.3 The Memory System 
Figure 2.4 The Pandemonium 
function. They can be grouped according to the functions 
for which they are responsible. These are Action demons, 
Recognition demons and Word demons etc. The Pandemonium 
in which all demons reside is an unruly place, where all 
the demons are competing with each other for control. In 
particular, within the Pandemonium there exists no 
"godfather" demon that can exert control over other 
demons. The Pandemonium is therefore a place with 
"lawless violence and uproar, which is constantly in a 
state of confusion" (10). 
As their name suggests, Action demons control the 
effector mechanism of the body; Recognition demons are 
input specialists, each of which is tuned to respond to a 
particular feature of the sensory input and Word demons 
control the usage of words. The following examples will 
illustrate the importance of demons' role in the control 
of our everyday actions. 
Learning new skills requires great concentration. It can 
be felt when one is learning to swim or playing snooker 
for the first time. Every move required has to be 
consciously performed. However, after practising these 
moves many times over, the concentration required in the 
performance of these actions will be lessened to the 
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extent of being semi-automatic in nature. One extremely 
good example is walking. 
When a child is learning to walk, he has to devote all 
his attention to the coordination of his limbs and body. 
After many tumbles and falls, he finally learns to walk 
and then he will no longer be conscious of the walking 
process. The required set of actions for walking will be 
stored and a "walk" demon is born. Once a demon is 
constructed, the shrieks from the Intention system 
messenger - "I want to walk" - will activate the "walk" 
demon and it will then assume control of the body (Figure 
2.2) • 
The benefits of this type of devolution of labour are 
obvious. If we have to devote all our concentration every 
time we want to walk, nothing SUbstantial will ever be 
achieved. We will not be able to notice the dresses 
displayed in the shop windows while walking down Sloane 
street to the underground station or talk while we walk. 
One cannot fail to appreciate how utterly boring such an 
existence would be. Demons can thus be regarded as 
dedicated machines and once they are activated they will 
happily continue to perform their tasks without any 
supervision. However, it must be also clear that this 
type of devolution of labour has its drawback because the 
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less the consciousness participates in the effecting of 
actions, the less detail control it has over the outcome 
of the actions. Demons can be misfired and "Action" 
errors are mostly caused by the misfiring of demons. 
2.2.4 Activation of Demons 
It is convenient to regard cognitive demons as being made 
up of TOTE (Test-Operate-Test-Exit) (10), nesting one 
within another like a Russian doll. It is therefore clear 
that there are two types of demons 
- Testing and 
- Operating 
Action and Word demons are activated by shrieks of the 
message from the Intention system and Recognition demons 
receive their triggers from the sensory input. Each demon 
is activated by a set of conditions which may be external 
or internal. It is possible for a demon to misfire and 
this is most likely when the schema of the on-going 
activities resembles closely another schema, into which 
the misfired demon is incorporated. The relationships 
between the activations of demons and errors are 
discussed further in chapter 3. The cognitive system 
described above is basically true for all cognitive 
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systems. Very specialized mental functions contain extra 
characteristics themselves, which are specific to the 
cognitive functions required. The special cognitive 
characteristics of a process control operator is 
described below. 
2.3 Different Modes of Process Control operator Behaviour 
In highly automated process control plants, the major 
task of the operator is monitoring. If the operator 
detects an abnormal situation, he will act according to 
the training he received. The operator has to perform 
three separate functions, namely perception, thought and 
intervention. 
Perception: 
Thought 
The reception and interpretation of data as 
supplied by the visual and acoustic 
indicating devices of the system, which 
provide information about the state of the 
system. 
The evaluation of the state of the system 
and the determination of the operation to 
be performed. 
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Intervention: The operation of control elements 
(switches, handles, etc.). The operator 
generally receives a signal of the result 
of the intervention insome form or other. 
When the plant is operating normally, little or no 
intervention is required from the operator, i.e., the 
operator thought, from the signals he received from the 
plant, that the plant is in a desirable state and decided 
that no intervention is required. 
During an abnormal situation, a typical task of the 
operator is described below (Figure 2.5) (12): 
At time T1, the system is in a desired state Sl and plant 
condition C1. At time T1, an unexpected event E1, such as 
a valve failure took place. E1 causes the system to 
change to state S2 and plant condition C2, which may be 
undesirable. The operator will have to identify the plant 
state at T2 based on the data, i.e., C2, he received in 
the control room. He will have to diagnose the cause of 
this change of state and make a prognosis according to 
his diagnosis. The operator will need to decide on a 
course of action which will shift the system from the 
undesirable state S2 to S3 (which may be identical to 
Sl). 
28 
INITIATING 
EVENT 
El,Tl 
CONTROL ROOM CONTROL ROOM DIAGNOSIS PLANT STATE 
CONDITION , CONDITION 
Cl,Sl,Tl C2,S2,T2 S2, T2 
PROGNOSIS 
AND 
ACTION 
CONTROL ROOM PROGNOSIS PLANT STATE 
CONDITION CTRL RM COND 
C3,S3,T3 C3,S3,T3 S3, T3 
Figure 2.5 Steps Required During Operation Under Abnormal Plant 
Condition 
KNOWLEDGE-
BASED 
r OAL 
IDENTIFY ｾ＠ DECIDE ｾ＠
LINK TO 
RULE-
BASED 
- RECOGNIZE ｾ＠
SKILL-
BASED 
FEATURE 
EXTRACTION 
t t t 
TASK 
PLAN 
RULES 
SKILLED 
OPERATION 
-------------------------------------
Figure 2.6 The Three Categories of Operator Activity 
In most cases, the system state is recognized and the 
relevant tasks to be performed as laid down in the 
operating manual can be followed. The required course of 
action is nevertheless expected and as such no elaborate 
thinking is required of the operator. Under some very 
unexpected situations, the state of the system may not be 
immediately recognizable, nor may it be detailed in the 
operating manual. In order to decide on a goal (state 
S3), the operator will have to rely on his own judgement 
in order to select a course of actions, formulate a plan 
according to the safety and operational requirements, and 
carry out his plan. The operator's judgement will be 
based on his knowledge of the design, the operation of 
the plant and physics. 
Rasmussen classified the behaviour and actions of a 
process control plant operator into three categories: 
Skill-based, Rule-based and Knowledge-based levels of 
behaviour (9). Evidence to support the existence of these 
separate categories has been confirmed in the 
observations of the operator in action (11,12) (Figure 
2.6) (9). 
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2.3.1 Skill-based Behaviour 
Skill-based behaviour refers to behaviour which involves 
well-learnt and mostly automatic reactions. The 
executions of these reactions are automatic and do not 
require attention. These skill-based actions involve 
mainly one step actions which constitute the basic 
building blocks of human activity. As can be readily 
appreciated, skill-based activities are closely 
associated with demons (section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4) and 
errors within this category of actions share the same 
mechanism with the errors associated with the activation 
of demons (chapter 3). 
2.3.2 Rule-based Behaviour 
During training, the operator practises dealing with the 
more likely faults. Provisions related to these possible 
faults are also included in the operating instructions 
for dealing with likely operating faults. Hence, when 
such a fault occurs, the actions required from the 
operator are as follows: 
- Recognition of the operating fault based on the plant 
parameters. 
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Assignment of the task to be performed in the known 
way. 
- Execution in accordance with the instruction. 
Rule-based behaviour refers to behaviour where the 
operator knows that he has the information on what to do, 
either from memory or from some manuals. The actions 
required in this mode involve mostly multiple steps 
actions. These are generally linked together by some 
testing, such as if A is true then do B. Rule-based 
behaviour requires attention during the execution of the 
actions but attention may not be required continuously 
because rule-based actions may themselves be made up of 
many one step skill-based actions and so no attention 
will be required to perform them. 
2.3.3 Knowledge-based Behaviour 
Knowledge-based behaviour refers to the situation when 
the operator does not know what to do or when he cannot 
relate to the situation. He will then need to use his 
general knowledge and common sense to try to devise a 
solution to the problem and to construct a plan and 
strategy. This mode of behaviour requires attention 
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constantly because the operator has to be on constant 
alert in order to monitor the behaviour of the system. 
Knowledge-based behaviour occurs in particular when the 
operator fails to identify the state of the system and 
therefore he cannot predict the subsequent behaviour of 
the plant. As a result, he will have to be particularly 
vigilant over the monitoring of the plant signals and he 
has to make sure that no unexpected change in plant 
parameters escapes his notice. This sort of extra demand 
for sustained attention from the operator is sufficient 
to produce a stress response (13). 
2.4 summary 
In this chapter, a generic cognitive model which can 
account for different human errors was examined. In 
addition, a specific cognitive model describing the 
nature of the behaviour of process control operators was 
examined. In the next chapter, major causes of human 
errors will be described in detail and their relations to 
the cognitive system will be discussed. 
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3. Causes of Errors 
3.1 Introduction 
The main differences between human activities and machine 
operation are the greater variability and seeming 
unpredictability associated with human actions. If the 
operator has to perform a certain operation many times 
over, the characteristics associated with the execution 
of the operation, such as the speed of execution or 
strength, will vary greatly as compared to an equivalent 
machine operation. 
In general, an error occurs when a planned action fails 
to achieve its desired outcome, and when such a failure 
cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance 
occurrence. Errors can be committed at two different 
levels: the perception-intervention level (Action errors) 
and mental errors (Decision errors) (Figure 2.6). 
Action errors rarely have serious consequences in a 
modern nuclear power plant. Most of the time, these 
errors will be corrected by the operator themselves or at 
worst, the protective system will be activated and the 
safety of the plant is thus ensured. Decision errors 
33 
however are more important and may have more significant 
consequences. 
The forms of Action and Decision errors can take are 
closely linked with the organization and functioning of 
the cognitive systems. The relationships between errors 
and the organization of the cognitive system will be 
discussed in section 3.3. 
3.2 Factors Affecting Operator Performance 
There are many factors which can affect the performance 
of the operators and they can be broadly separated into 
two categories, external factors and internal factors. In 
addition, there are the effects of stress. The 
performance of the operator can be affected in two ways, 
in terms of susceptibility to Decision errors and Action 
errors 
The external factors are mainly concerned with the design 
of the plant, its management and ergonomic aspects. The 
internal factors are mainly concerned with the individual 
characteristics of the operating personnel, such as 
operator qualification, experience and intelligence, etc. 
stress generally occurs when the external and internal 
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factors are in conflict, e.g., if the work imposes too 
heavy a burden on the operator. 
For an existing plant, there is little one can change in 
the area of design once the plant has been built. The 
same arguments can be applied to the ergonomic aspect of 
plant control. Of the many external factors, the 
management and the underlying working philosophy of plant 
operation may be the least difficult to change; though 
this does not mean that no resistance, union or otherwise 
will be encountered. 
The internal factors can be dealt with with less 
difficulties, such as by requiring prospective operators 
to undergo psychological and IQ tests. The intelligence 
and personality of the prospective operator can be 
evaluated and therefore operators with all or nearly all 
the characteristics required of a nuclear power plant 
operator can be selected, that is assuming that such a 
profile can be defined in the first place. 
The influence of stress on human behaviour has been a 
topic for inquiry for many years. Interest in this area 
is fuelled largely by two factors. It is believed that a 
better and profound understanding of human abilities may 
be gained from the study of individuals' reactions to 
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extreme conditions and the second reason is a practical 
one. It is increasingly important for many different 
utilities, notably the nuclear electric industry, to 
understand the reactions of their personnel under 
stressful operating conditions. 
A detailed examination of the effects of stress will be 
taken in chapter 4. 
3.2.1 External Factors 
There are many external factors which can affect the 
performance of the operator and a list of these factors 
is listed in table 3.1 (26). The conditions of the 
working environment will affect the comfort of the 
operators which may in turn affect operator performance. 
A detail examination of these factors is beyond the scope 
of this study but in general, the management of the 
operation of the plant, the management of the operating 
personnel, design emphasis of the plant and the ergonomic 
design of the controls will all affect the performance of 
the operator. A brief discussion of the effects of the 
environmental factors will be given below as an example 
since environmental discomfort can very often cause 
stress. 
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External Factors Affecting Operator Performance: 
Building Construction 
Quality of Environment: 
, I' .., ｾｲｾ｜Ｈ＿＠ ｾＧｲ［ＺａＨ＠ , 
Temperature 
Humidity 
Air purity 
Noise 
Vibration etc. 
Management Factors: 
Shift pattern 
Responsibility assignment 
Bonuses 
Recognition 
Benefits 
Working Philosophy: 
Degree of reliance on verbal and written 
instructions 
communication between team members 
Preventive measures 
operation guide-lines 
Established practice 
Design Concepts: 
Perception requirements 
Motor requirements (speed, power, accuracy etc) 
Relationship between control elements and 
indicators 
Interpretation requirements 
Information load 
Frequency of repetition of tasks 
Requirements on transient or long span memory 
criticality of tasks 
Calculation requirements 
Indications of the results of operations 
Team structure requirements 
Ergonomic Considerations: 
Design of basic equipments 
positioning of indicators etc. on the control 
panel 
Man-machine relationship 
Table 3.1 External Factors Affecting Operator Performance 
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Internal Factors Affecting operator Performance: 
Individual Characteristics: 
Qualifications 
Experience acquired in previous job 
Experience acquired in present job 
Personality 
Intelligence 
Motivation and attitude 
Assumed knowledge of instructions and 
specifications 
Physical conditions (mental and physical fitness) 
outside influence (e.g., family or political 
persuasion) 
Table 3.2 Internal Factors Affecting operator Performance 
Causes of stress: 
Psychological: 
suddenness of event 
Time constraint 
Speed of execution of task 
Information load 
Consequences of failure of task 
Fear (of failure, of loss of job, recrimination) 
Monotony of work (boredom) 
Length of long and uneventful duty period 
unstimulating environment 
Conflicts of work and personal belief 
Distraction (noise, movement etc) 
Physiological: 
Long period of psychological stress 
Tiredness 
pain or discomfort 
Hunger or thirst 
Temperature 
Freedom of movement 
Degree of physical exercise 
Table 3.3 Causes of stress (Szabo) Action errors. 
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3.2.1.1 Example - Sound 
The operators are required to be vigilant and studies in 
noise effects have produced evidence that vigilant 
performance is indeed affected by noise level, though no 
systematic pattern emerged (13). In general, performance 
is degraded by a high level of white noise (above 90 db) 
when processing demands are high. Performance level 
remains unchanged when processing demands are low whether 
the white noise level is above or below 90 db. It also 
appeared that performance during low task demand is 
enhanced by the presence of low-level varied noise. 
Generally, a low level of sound is considered a low 
stress condition and presents little adverse effect on 
operator performance. Therefore, noise can be considered 
unidirectional in effect. 
3.2.1.2 Example - Temperature 
The other usual cause of discomfort is changes in 
temperature. The effects are bidirectional because both 
high and low temperature are stressful. Research has 
shown that an increase in ｢ｯｾｹ＠ temperature speeds the 
apparent duration perceived by the operator, whereas a 
decrease in body temperature slows it down (13). It has 
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been suggested that this change in duration perception by 
the operator is one of the fundamental causes of 
performance variation on a number of tasks that require 
sustained attention. 
3.2.2 Internal Factors 
operating a process control plant requires certain 
characteristics. The personality of the operator may 
affect his performance and this is particularly true 
during a crisis situation. A list of some of the internal 
factors which can affect operator performance can be 
found in table 3.2. (26). A brief discussion about 
qualification of operators and experience is given below. 
3.2.2.1 Example - Qualifications 
Qualification will have some bearing on the performance 
of the operator. When the plant is operating normally, 
the major task of the operator is monitoring. In the case 
of an operating fault, however, the highest 
qualifications are essential to good performance. If 
"the operator is highly qualified, the routine 
monitoring tasks will not be demanding enough 
for him. Consequently the operator may become 
bored and will not be well motivated. Boredom is 
also a frequent contributor to stress. However, 
if the operator is not very well qualified, he 
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ｭｾｹ＠ not have ｴｾ･＠ knowledge nor skill to cope 
w1th an operat1ng fault; particularly if the 
recovery of the plant requires independent 
thinking." (14). 
3.2.2.2 Example - Experience 
It has been suggested (4) that experience will increase 
the operator's resilience to stress. An experienced 
operator will possess some empirical knowledge which may 
not be documented. Experienced operators may also have 
intuitions which cannot be easily explained. They may 
also be able to judge the relative success likelihood of 
different alternatives more accurately. Extra experience 
enables the operator to feel that he is in control, which 
serves to reduce the degree of stress felt by the 
operator. 
3.2.3 stress 
stress arises because an individual feels unable to cope 
with the demand of the situation and is mainly dependent 
on the perception of the individual in question. Although 
stress does produce physiological symptoms in the 
individual and these are relatively difficult to fake, 
these do not represent the true extent of stress the 
subject is experiencing. A better measure of the level of 
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stress experienced by an individual is the sUbjective 
feeling of the individual in a given situation. 
stress is often viewed as one of the fundamental reasons 
of performance degradation. However, when a person 
describes himself as stressed, he is merely describing 
the physical and mental state he feels he is in and as 
such does not provide any indication to the cause of this 
state. stress can be caused by many factors and a list of 
these factors can be found in table 3.3 (26). 
It must be emphasised that there are many factors which 
can cause stress and these can be external, e.g., 
temperature and humidity, or internal, e.g., fear. stress 
is closely coupled with the external and internal factors 
discussed in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. It is not yet clear how 
these factors affect the sUbjective stress level of an 
individual because the precise interactions between 
different stressors are not understood. The interactions 
between the stressors could be additive, synergistic or 
antagonistic. Sleep loss and noise, for example, have 
been found to have antagonistic effects (13). 
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3.3 Mechanisms of Error Commission 
The difficulties associated with the study of errors are 
best described by Reason and Mycielska (10): 
"Error, •••••• is not an easy notion to pin 
down. If we look for its meaning in the 
dictionary, we are sent on a semantic circular 
tour through other terms such as mistake, fault, 
defect, and back to error again. The fact that 
dictionaries yield synonyms rather than a 
definition suggests that the notion of error is 
something fundamental and irreducible." 
Reason (15) classified errors into three categories, 
Slips, Lapses and Mistakes and the definition for error 
as used by Reason will again be adopted here • A slip is 
having the correct intention but the actions carried out 
were wrong. A lapse is when an intention is forgotten and 
a mistake is when the intention itself is wrong. Reason 
associated slips with absent-mindedness (10) and are 
closely related to the activation of demons. The central 
argument being: 
"the belief that systematic forms of human error 
have their origins in fundamentally useful 
processes. However, the centralised operation of 
high risk, complex, and incompletely understood 
process systems can, on occasion, transform 
these normally adaptive human processes into 
dangerous liabilities." 
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3.3.1 Action Errors and the Activation of Demons 
As mentioned in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, demons are 
dedicated machines and are in general specialists. Once a 
demon is activated, it will happily continue to perform 
its designated task without further supervision from the 
"consciousness". since "consciousness" participates 
little in the action of the demon, it will have little 
direct control over actions performed by the demon. 
Demons can be misfired and the misfiring of demons are 
one of the major causes of " Action" errors. 
Action errors are closely coupled with slips. Slips occur 
during largely automatic execution of well eptablished 
routine sequences of actions in which demands upon 
continuous attention for control are small. Slips are 
associated with distraction or preoccupation. They are 
most likely to occur when limited attentional resources 
are allocated to some external or internal matters which 
are totally unrelated to the on-going environments, where 
there are few departures from the expected and, 
therefore, require little outward vigilance. There are 
indications that the liability to minor cognitive 
failures has some relationship to an individual's general 
vulnerability to stress (14) 
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3.3.1.1 Misfiring of Demons 
The role played by the misfire of demons in error is best 
illustrated by an example. 
A commuter travels to waterloo station every morning. He 
then walks to the bus stop in order to wait for bus 171 
to the city University. He has trained himself to look 
out for the bus while crossing the bridge. If he sees bus 
171 approaching, he will run across the bridge so that he 
will not miss the bus. One saturday morning, he had 
arranged to meet his friend at Charing Cross station and 
decided to walk there. 
He arrived at Waterloo station and while he was crossing 
the same bridge he crosses everyday, he noticed that bus 
171 was approaching. He only realised his mistake when 
the bus was pulling out of the bus stop with him in it. 
The similarity between the on-going situation and the 
schema of going to work is the basic cause of this 
sUbstitution of actions. 
Ｏｾｾ＠ ... -.---- -- .... ｾＧＢ＠
(schemata)are organised memory units. They are active 
\ ,./ 
organi'sations of past reactions to past experiences. 
Schemata are always present in any well-adapted organic 
response. Determination by schemata is the most 
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fundamental of all the ways in which human beings can be 
influenced by reactions and experiences. Schemata control 
is continuously switching between the Intention store and 
Action store. The sequence of control is as follows: 
When the commuter arrives at Waterloo station, the 
Intention system is in control. He "knows" that he is 
going to meet his friend. Then the control is passed to 
the "walk" demon and the "intention" to meet his friend 
has gone into hibernation. However, on crossing the 
bridge, the on-going situation resembled the schema of 
"going to City University", and when the bus arrived, the 
schema is completed and this prompted the "run" demon to 
fire. While he was crossing the bridge, the control was 
hijacked from the "walk" demon by the "going to city 
University" demon. Once the man was sitting in the bus, 
the control was returned to the Intention system and then 
he realised his mistake. 
3.3.1.2 Attention capture 
As described in section 2.2.1, intentions need to be 
constantly refreshed in the Intention store. However, 
when some external events, which cause other intentions 
to be triggered occur, the attention of the person can be 
captured. The intentions triggered by these external 
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events can sometimes take precedence over the original 
intention, which should then be put into hibernation. At 
the completion of the tasks required by the overriding 
intention, the original intention should then emerge from 
hibernation. This system of first in last out Intention 
store is analogous to a stack machine. However, in this 
stack storage system, the first-in intention can be lost 
because of the finite life span of the intentions stored 
in the Intention store. 
Although the control is eventually returned to the 
Intention store, the original intention may be lost. 
Under these circumstances, the demon in the schema of 
which the on-going situation resembles most will take 
control. Most errors associated with the forgetting of 
intentions are of this type. 
The memory of the Intention store is refreshed 
constantly. In framing an intention to do anything, a 
state of tension just sufficient to remind us of the 
stored intention is created. The more important that 
intention is, the greater the stress generated. As a 
result, though performed, some residual feeling may 
remain and·may cause an important intention to fire 
again. 
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3.3.1.3 Over Attention 
This type of error is most readily appreciated by the 
highly skilled professionals such as top class musicians 
and snooker players. This syndrome is also known as the 
"nosey adviser syndrome". Basically, over attention can 
cause some well practised actions to falter because 
control of this type of action is mostly controlled by 
the respective Action demons. Demons are created in order 
to take over control of certain actions and as such 
demons can be considered to be a finely tuned but 
dedicated machine. This situation is analogous to the 
relationship between the apprentice and the supervisor. 
For example, having learnt how to solder from the 
supervisor, the apprentice had been delegated the sole 
job of soldering. Since the apprentice has more practice 
at soldering than the supervisor, who may be more 
knowledgeable at the general theory and techniques of 
soldering, the apprentice becomes more proficient at the 
actual soldering than the supervisor. Over attention is 
equivalent to the supervisor suddenly deciding, after 
twenty years of not having done any soldering, to do his 
own work. It can be guarantied that his performance will 
be inferior to that of the apprentice. 
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3.3.1.4 Program counter Failures 
For the successful completion of a plan, many largely 
automatic actions have to be carried out sequentially. 
Each plan of action will involve a unique sequence of 
actions to be performed and therefore an automatic 
device, analogous to a counter, is needed to keep track 
of the action sequence. 
This cognitive program counter can fail in its operation 
mainly by miscounting actions. This can happen when the 
counter miscounts a thought as an action and thus 
proceeds to the next required action in line. Program 
counter failures are generally the cause of errors of 
omissions and lapses. 
3.3.1.5 Anticipating Leaps 
When intentions are framed, a state of tension is created 
with it. This tension serves as a reminder to the 
Intention store. If this intention involves a primal 
action demon which has a high level of tension associated 
with it, this primal demon may jump the queue of demons. 
Tension is not a pleasant feeling and the person will 
want to remove this tension as soon as possible. 
49 
Basically, the higher the tension associated with the 
intention, the more the person needs to remove it. As a 
result, the on-going state of need for the person is the 
removal of the tension, which implies the completion of 
that intention. 
3.3.1.6 Habit Intrusion 
Man is an animal of habit. Habit is a mixed blessing 
indeed and it can divert our actions, but most important 
of all, it can in some cases impose restriction upon our 
thinking. Habits of action are easily detectable but" 
habits of thought are not. As a result, habits of thought 
can be self perpetuating and seem to emerge when they are 
most unwanted. In general, the stronger the habit, the 
easier it is for it to emerge. 
The causes of habit intrusion are manifold. Habit 
intrusion is most likely to occur when there are strong 
established linkages between demons within the action 
store. They can also happen as a result of external 
circumstances prevailing at the time. 
Errors due to habit intrusion are characterised by 
inertia, rigidity or reservation. They are most likely to 
ｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ
occur when a change of goal necessitates a departure from 
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routine or a change of circumstance demands modification 
of a preestablished action pattern. If habit intrusion 
occurs in thought then decision errors will result. 
3.3.2 Decision Errors and cognitive Demons 
False impression or hypothesis is especially likely to 
occur and be accepted during a period of high stress and 
high anxiety (10). It is also likely to occur immediately 
after a successful recovery from an emergency because 
there is a natural tendency to relax one's vigilance. The 
successful management of an emergency creates a euphoric 
feeling which can last much longer than it actually 
warrants. When a person is trapped in a false sense of 
euphoria, his guard will be lowered and under these 
circumstances, a false hypothesis which fits in with his 
needs and expectations has a strong chance of being 
accepted. Once a hypothesis is accepted, the Intention 
system shows a marked resistance to abandon it. This 
sentiment is echoed by the great theoretical physicist 
Einstein: 
"If facts don't fit the theory, then the facts 
are wrong." 
There are various factors which influence the occurrence 
and acceptance of wrong impression or hypothesis (10). 
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3.3.2.1 Frequency 
It is found that the more frequent a cognitive demon is 
called, the easier this demon will spring into action of 
its own accord even when the situation is entirely 
inappropriate. 
3.3.2.2 Incongruity 
Four different types of reactions are possible when a 
person is faced with absurdity and inconsistencies. These 
are dominance, compromise, disruption and recognition. In 
the dominance mode, he will deny the incongruous 
elements; in the compromise mode, he will attempt to 
resolve the conflict; in disruption mode, he will fail to 
resolve the conflict and will respond with bizarre 
actions and, finally, in the recognition mode, he will 
realise that a false hypothesis is used and this is 
normally preceded by a vague sense of wrongness. 
3.3.2.3 context 
The human mind processes information mainly in two ways, 
namely top-down and bottom-up. In the top-down mode, 
higher level knowledge determines the way inputs from 
specific feature demons are perceived. In the bottom-up 
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mode, minor demons identify specific features at the 
lowest level of processing which are then combined by 
higher level demons into patterns. with the aid of 
context, less information is needed to hypothesize. 
similarity in context (schemata reasoning) could cause 
inappropriate cognitive demons to fire and the creation 
of a wrong hypothesis. 
3.3.2.4 Need 
Human sometimes perceive that they want to perceive. For 
example, when an abstract picture is shown to a person 
who has been deprived of food, he is very likely to 
perceive the image on the picture to an image of food. 
3.4 summary 
In this chapter, the major causes of human errors were 
examined and their relationships to various cognitive 
models were discussed. In the next chapter, the effects 
of stress on the operator and in particular, his 
cognitive processing abilities will be described. Also, 
in the next chapter, a framework for modelling the 
effects of stress and errors will be proposed. 
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4. Framework for Modelling the Effects of stress 
4.1 Introduction 
stress has two major effects on a process control 
operator. First it can cause an increase in Action errors 
and second the cognitive processing abilities of the 
operator will also be impaired. This impairment will in 
turn cause Decision errors to occur. Of the two types of 
errors, Decision errors are of more significance. The 
findings of stress researches are mainly qualitative in 
nature but the researches seem to be unanimous on the 
effects of stress on the cognitive processing functions 
of the operators. However, the findings concerning the 
effects on Action errors are less conclusive and, in 
fact, it is still an area of much debate (6,8). 
There are many causes of stress and some of these are not 
as obvious as otherwise expected. Fear, boredom and shift 
work can all cause changes to the level of stress 
experienced or perceived by the operator. In general, 
stress arises because the operator feels unable to cope 
with the demands of the situation and here is the 
definition of stress as used by Baker and Marshall (14) -
"stress is a subjective state, having negative 
connotations, which arises in response to a stressor 
and entails a feeling of inability to cope." 
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A detailed survey of the research on stress can be found 
in (14) as well as a full discussion on the effects of 
stress on the cognitive abilities of the process control 
plant operator. In addition, observations of the 
operators' behaviour during a crisis situation (11,12) 
appear to corroborate with the findings of (14). Research 
into the effects of stress on the Action error commission 
rates has produced some useful statistics (4) and are, up 
to a certain extent, supported by empirical results (8). 
A full discussion on these effects is beyond the scope of 
this work and only a summary of these effects is provided 
here. 
4.2 The Effects of stress 
4.2.1 cognitive Aspects 
One of the major effects of stress is the degradation of 
the reasoning ability of the operator in the following 
ways: 
1. Increasing rigidity in problem solving 
2. Narrowing of the attention and perceptual field 
3. Mindset 
4. Reversion to Skill-based behaviour 
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When an operator is stressed, he will experience 
increasing rigidity in problem-solving. This means that 
his choice of solution will be influenced by the 
frequency a solution has been used and how regular the 
solution is, while the appropriateness of the solution 
will not necessary be foremost in his selection criteria. 
At the same time the operator's attention and his 
perceptual field will be narrowed temporally and 
spatially, which can lead to important stimuli being 
ignored. In addition, the operator will be increasingly 
reluctant in admitting that wrong decisions have been 
made and this syndrome is known as mindset. Mindset is 
said to have occurred when the operator identifies the 
plant state incorrectly but persists in interpreting the 
data to fit the perceived state or hypothesis. As a 
result of mindset, the operator will tolerate a larger 
deviation from the expected symptoms to occur before 
other alternatives are explored. 
Finally, when the operator is stressed, he will tend 
towards Skill-based behaviour and this reversion has been 
confirmed in the observation of operators performing 
during a crisis situation (12). Skill-based behaviour, as 
discussed in section 2.3.1, consists mainly of automatic 
responses. The degree of control exercised by the 
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operator over his actions is lower than in Rule- or 
Knowledge-based mode and therefore there is more room for 
errors. When Skill-based behaviour is favoured over Rule-
and Knowledge-based behaviour, the general level of 
control exercised by the operator is effectively less 
than when no such bias is present. When the operator 
reverts to Skill-based behaviour, the methods used to 
achieve certain goals will be biased towards those of 
which the operator has more practise. On the other hand, 
if the operator is operating normally in Rule- or 
Knowledge-based mode, the selection of methods will be 
guided by the appropriateness of the methods in the given 
situation. 
4.2.2 statistical Treatment of Action Errors 
When an operator is placed under stress, he will become 
more prone to Action errors. As discussed in section 
3.3.1, Action errors are closely associated with the 
activation of demons which in turn characterizes Skill-
based behaviour. 
The mechanisms of Action errors are essentially those 
associated with demon activations as discussed in section 
3.3.1. It can be readily seen that Action errors are not 
random and are in fact highly context sensitive. This can 
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be best illustrated using one of Reason's examples 
concerning year change (38). When a new year has just 
arrived, it can be predicted with a very high degree of 
certainty that one will miswrite the previous year 
instead of the new year sometime during the first month. 
However, in the middle of a year, this error becomes 
extremely rare. 
4.2.2.1 Human reliability Approach 
It is clear that a purely statistical treatment of Action 
errors will not sufficiently capture the essence of this 
type of error. The mechanisms by which these errors can 
be made further illustrate this deficiency. The 
statement, lithe probability of miswriting the old year 
instead of the year is yll, where y is a constant, is 
clearly incorrect because we know that the probability is 
dependent on the time of year the action is performed. 
Nevertheless, Swain and Guttmann's probabilistic 
treatment of actions, known as the Human reliability 
Approach (HRA) (4) remains one of the best methods 
available for assessing Action errors. It is known that 
even top class operators can commit errors under perfect 
operating conditions and these errors cannot be 
eliminated, though the probability of error commission 
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can be modified. This treatment is consistent with the 
fact that Action errors are inherent in every human 
activity. The error commission rates for this type of 
errors are proposed by Swain and Guttmann. The frequency 
and probability of Action errors are referred to not as a 
unit of time but as the number of operations performed 
and is known as the Human Error Probability distribution 
(HEP). 
Action errors can be classified as follows (4) and the 
HEP for each type of action error was proposed for 
specific plant systems: 
_ Omission: failure to perform a given action 
_ Faculty execution: performance of the activity not 
according to instructions. 
_ Inappropriate action: action which should have been 
performed 
_ Sequential error: the order of actions is mixed up 
Time errors: intervention took place at the wrong time, 
either too late or too early 
The Human Reliability Approach assumed that the 
be calculated by means of a probability of error can 
. f all the factors which can affect 
careful considerat10n 0 
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the performance quality of the operator. These are known 
as Performance Shaping Factors (PSF). 
The real error probability can be obtained by modifying 
the base HEP with the Performance Shaping Factors 
associated with the effects present. The PSFs are applied 
to the base probability by multiplication. 
The empirical results from the study by Beare et al (8) 
neither fully proved the validity of the proposed HEPs 
nor did they demonstrate the validity of the proposed HEPs 
there is no evidence to support the PSF proposed for 
experienced operators. The main objections to the 
statistical approach is that the underlying mechanisms 
for Action errors were not covered by this modelling 
method, and the assumption that the various factors 
affecting operator performance is multiplicative, and the 
effects of each factor do affect each other (14). 
4.2.2.2 stress and Other Factors 
Although support for increase in errors in the high 
stress faults was observed only in the case of the 
Boiling Water reactor and not the Pressure Water Reactor, 
Beare et al (8) concluded that "despite the anomalous 
results observed in this study, it would be prudent to 
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use the Handbook (Swain and Guttmann) modifiers for 
stress when performing human reliability estimates." The 
major problem associated with this conclusion is that 
other factors for increasing error rates have not been 
wholly eliminated. 
There are many other performance shaping factors and the 
interactions between these factors are not well 
understood. For example, excess heat can cause discomfort 
which can in turn be interpreted as causing physiological 
stress. It is not certain whether temperature discomfort 
should be treated as a single stressor only, or as a 
separate environmental factor and contributes toward the 
degree of stress experienced by the operator. 
Furthermore, there is an optimum level of stress below 
which the efficiency and reliability of the operator is 
degraded (Figure 4.1) (12). This could be viewed in terms 
of boredom. In this study, stress is treated as the only 
source of error, which is in addition to the basic non-
eliminable errors. The treatment of the bidirectional 
effects is discussed later in chapter 6. 
4.3 Experience and stress 
The Human Reliability Approach proposes that novice 
operators will commit four times as much errors as 
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Figure 4.1 The Effect of Stress on The Efficiency of the Operator 
experience operators though this prediction ｾ＠ ... not been 
supported by experimental evidence (8). There are however 
indications that experience does indeed lower the error 
commission rate slightly. Experience may act as a 
psychological buffer against stress in the more 
experienced operator but on the other hand, the 
experience of the operator may act as an additional 
source of knowledge which is not available to the novice 
operator. 
Experience thus has two effects on the reliability of the 
operator. First, it affects the operator on the cognitive 
level and makes available a pool of knowledge. Second, it 
can reduce the level of stress experienced by the 
operator and in doing so reduces the rate of Action error 
commission. The precise role of experience is not clear 
and although its interaction with other stressors is not 
understood, it is reasonable to assume that experience is 
a significant factor in the coping of stress and plays a 
significant role in the cognitive processes of the human 
mind. 
4.4 Modelling Methodology 
stress degrades the performance of the operator. This 
degradation manifests itself as physical and 
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psychological changes in the operator. Unfortunately, 
these changes cannot be easily represented within a 
computerised model of the operator, so a different but 
necessary correct description of the degradation of 
performance must be adopted instead. In addition, since 
experience increases the tolerance of operators to 
stress, the interactions between stress, experience and 
the cognitive model representing reasoning processes of 
the operator must be clearly modelled. 
Experience increases the body of knowledge available to a 
person, perhaps in the form of rules of thumb, direct 
correlations between symptoms and causes etc. At the same 
time, experience can sometimes enable the person to 
utilise better existing available knowledge to generate 
new knowledge. The generation of new knowledge from old 
knowledge is otherwise known as creativity and the 
modelling of which is beyond present day know-hows. The 
knowledge about the utilisation of knowledge is also 
known in Artificial Intelligence jargon as metaknowledge. 
During the development of the error modelling framework, 
it was decided that the model will be separated into two 
submodels, cognitive and statistical (Figure 4.2). The 
cognitive submodel essentially models the reasoning 
processes and Decision errors. The statistical model 
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Figure 4.2 Interaction Between the Cognitive Submodel and the 
Statistical Kodel 
models the generation of Action errors. Experience 
affects both of the submodels but within the confine of 
the cognitive model, experience is modelled as the 
addition of extra knowledge. 
The two submodels are kept as self-contained as possible 
and the necessary interactions between them explicitly 
limited. The modular nature of the framework should 
enable a system to be gradually built up and the 
refinements made to a submodel will not necessitate major 
structural changes in the system. Since Action errors are 
found to have relatively less important effects, and due 
to the complexity involved, the statistical submodel will 
be excluded in the first instant and be introduced once 
the cognitive submodel has been refined. 
Finally, the computer implementation of the cognitive 
submodel assumes the basic construct of an expert system. 
Strictly speaking, the cognitive submodel is not an 
expert system because the implementation does not require 
the ｾ＠ efficient processing and representation 
techniques, such as those used in an expert system. The 
implementation instead 'should closely mimic the known 
cognitive processing methods and these criteria will 
cause the implementation to become an inefficient expert 
system. What may be a cognitively efficient processing 
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technique may not be an efficient computer 
implementation. In addition, the modelling of the effects 
of stress and the treatment of uncertainty will produce 
fundamental differences between the implementation of the 
cognitive model and an expert system. 
Nevertheless, the cognitive model will be considered as 
an expert system whose function is to perform decision 
making according to some underlying rules. These 
decisions may be very high level and abstract, such as 
"identify the state of the plant" and "decide on a course 
of action" etc. 
4.5 Definitions and Approximations Adopted 
This computer model adopts the following definitions and 
approximations: 
1. A perfect operator working under ideal operating 
condition is approximated to be entirely free of 
Decision errors. 
2. The only observable effect of stress is defined as the 
introduction of errors, both Action and Decision 
errors. 
3. The only observable effect of stress on the cognitive 
processes of the operator is defined as the 
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introduction of Decision errors. 
4. The coupling between the cognitive model and Action 
errors is assumed to be weak and is approximated to 
be independent of each other. 
5. Action errors are taken to be probabilistic and are 
not affected by the context in which they occur. The 
Human Reliability Approach is adopted here. 
6. Experience will only be allowed to affect the size of 
knowledge available to the operator. 
7. All changes in the cognitive processing mechanisms and 
the errors produced as a result of such changes are 
considered to be due to stress only. 
Approximations (1) to (3) are necessary due to the nature 
and constraints of modelling using computers. 
Approximation (4) implies that the operator will not be 
aware of any Action errors and therefore no recovery 
action is possible in this model. Although it is known 
that recovery does indeed happen and the effects of the 
decoupling approximation are not clear, this 
approximation is considered necessary at this stage in 
order to reduce the complexity to a manageable level. 
Although it is certain that Action errors are not 
entirely context free due to the mechanisms of Action 
error commission (see section 3.3.1), approximation (5) 
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is considered to be reasonable at this stage of model 
development. Otherwise, all actions required to be 
performed by the operator will have to be scrutinised, 
taking the position of the action within a sequence, the 
physical demand of the action, the spatial distribution 
of the control elements and the appearance of the control 
panel. Later models can be refined by taking the context 
of actions into account. 
Assumption (6) appears at first sight to be invalid 
because it is certain that experience will have some 
influence over the utilization of knowledge and 
information available to the operator and not simply 
increase the knowledge available. The restriction placed 
on the interactions between experience and the cognitive 
processing mechanism by this assumption is an artificial 
one. This assumption is needed for the ease of 
conceptualization of the operator model and its 
implementation, which will become clear in chapter 5. 
The additional knowledge, which does not affect the 
cognitive processing mechanisms of the operator model 
structurally, can be in the form of constraints e.g., 
physical laws which must not be violated, and empirical 
knowledge serving as short cuts. This restriction merely 
implies that constraint checking is built into the basic 
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cognitive processing mechanisms, although there may not 
be any constraints to satisfy. In the case of an 
experienced operator, constraints are present in the 
knowledge base and will have to be adhered to while the 
novice will not be aware of any constraints nor short 
cuts etc. 
4.6 cognitive Submodel 
As stated in approximation 3 in section 4.5, the only 
observable effect on the cognitive processes of the 
operator is defined as the introduction of Decision 
errors. There is as yet no successful mathematical model 
available for the representation of various cognitive 
processes, but cognitive models based on psychology are 
available (9,16,17,18,19,20,21,22). The representation of 
Decision errors should therefore compliment the available 
cognitive models and should be possible to be 
incorporated in a computer implementation of such a 
model. 
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4.6.1 Representation of Decision Errors 
During normal operation (when the operator is not 
stressed), a "rule" will fire only when all preconditions 
are satisfied and hence a decision, which is always 
correct, will be taken. When the operator is under 
stress, a wrong decision can be chosen although not all 
the required conditions are met. The basic definition of 
the effects of stress on the cognitive system used in the 
computer implementation is now extended to become: 
The only observable effect of stress on the cognitive 
process is the introduction of decision errors. 
unstressed decision making is analogous to a one to 
one mapping of conditions and decision (which can be 
translated into actions) whereas stressed decision 
making is analogous to a one to many mapping (Figure 
4.3 and 4.5) 
In other words, when the operator is not stressed, each 
unique set of conditions will produce only one set of 
response. For example, if y is the response of the 
operator and is dependent on x, the condition, then y = 
f(x) is a single value function. Under a normal 
situation, it is assumed that the operator will always 
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Figure 4.6 Fuzzification of Decision Paths Due to Stress 
select a certain path if the prerequisite conditions are 
met, e.g., if condition A is true, path 1 will always be 
selected (Figure 4.5). 
Node I represents the point where a decision is required, 
which can be translated into a response. This decision 
will be made according to some predefined conditions of 
the plant and the operator will seek information 
concerning the plant. Therefore, the input to the 
decision node is plant information and the output is a 
decision. 
When the operator is stressed, he may make a wrong 
decision and this is reflected in the operator taking a 
wrong path. In this case, even if condition A is true and 
condition B is not, there will still be a finite chance 
that path 2 will be selected and this is analogous to a 
one to many mapping (Figure 4.4 and 4.6). 
For example (Figure 4.6), condition A is true at node I. 
In this case, although condition A is definitely true, it 
is not the path to be taken that is determined but the 
probability for each path available for selection at node 
I is defined. This probability distribution is dependent 
upon the condition prevailing at the time. This means 
that although it is not known which path will be taken, 
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there is 90% chance that path 1,' which is the correct 
path, will be taken but at the same time there is a 0.1 
probability that the wrong path, path 2 will be chosen. 
The precise path selected will be determined only at run 
time, using a weighted random number generator. 
Conversely, if condition B is true then it is known that 
there is 70% chance for path 2 to be selected and 30% 
chance for the wrong path, path 1 to be taken. In this 
example, it can be readily appreciated that the chance 
for an error to occur is higher when condition B is true. 
4.6.2 Determination of Selection Likelihood 
As mentioned in section 4.6.1, the probability 
distribution for an individual path is dependent upon the 
condition prevailing at the time. In ordinary expert or 
knowledge-based systems, many methods have been used to 
enable an unambiguous decision to be selected based on 
uncertain or fuzzy real world data. In most of these 
implementations, such an ambiguous choice is made on the 
degree of support each received. In effect, a filtering 
mechanism is used for'path selection. Figure 4.6 can be 
reduced to Figure 4.5 by selecting the path with the 
highest support. 
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There are two methods by which the error likelihood can 
be obtained. The most obvious of which is by direct 
consultation with the operators. There will obviously be 
variations on the perceived probability for each path for 
each condition, so the amount of data which has to be 
acquired will be very large. The second approach, which 
is the preferred method here, is to utilize the 
uncertainty associated with human knowledge. 
The knowledge acquired from the operator will invariably 
involve some linguistic descriptors such as fairly high, 
rising rapidly etc. Real world data are mostly numerical 
data and these are often translated into natural language 
form. In this proposed representation of errors, it is 
proposed that the uncertainties due to the vagueness of 
the data should be retained and instead of a "depth 
first, search until succeed" strategy, a parallel 'search 
mechanism should be employed. The result of the parallel 
search will provide a set of supports for all the 
possible paths for selection at the decision node. These 
supports can be used as the inherent probability 
distribution for decision errors and will be used for 
path selection probabilistically. The result is that at 
each decision node, the path selected will not be 
deterministic but probabilistic. This implies that the 
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decision may not be the same given the same set of 
inputs, which is precisely the nature of errors. 
4.6.3 Representation of the Degradation of Inference 
Ability 
stress degrades the reasoning abilities of the operator 
and, since the inference engine of an expert system is 
responsible for reasoning, it seems reasonable to model 
this degradation as the production of an imperfect 
inference engine. In this model, different inference 
engines, each with a different degree of accuracy, will 
be used for different stress levels. For the ease of 
conceptualization, inference engines with different 
accuracy are considered to be represented as separate 
entities (Figure 4.7). In practice, difference in 
accuracy of the reasoning ability mayor may not require 
big structural changes to the inference engine. In some 
cases, the changes may be very minor such as the lowering 
of the tolerance threshold. The set of inference engines 
will need to be carefully designed to ensure that no 
unwanted discontinuity results. 
The effects of stress, in terms of problem solving 
rigidity, narrowing of the attention and perceptual 
field, mindset and the reversion to skill-based behaviour 
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can be represented as changes in the inference 
strategies. These changes will certainly have effects on 
the performance of the inference engine and therefore 
changes in inference engine accuracy will be facilitated 
by introducing changes to the inference strategies. 
4.6.3.1 Problem solving Rigidity 
When the operator is stressed, he tends to avoid the use 
of novel problem solving methods. He may select a 
conventional response such as a well tried method instead 
of pursuing more suitable solutions (11,12,14). In other 
words, there appears to be a restriction on his behaviour 
in terms of his readiness to accept novel solutions to 
problems. This rigidity can be represented by placing 
restrictions on the possible plans generated by the 
inference machine. Since a plan will invariably consist 
of bits of well known and tried sub-plans, a 
"conventional" metric can be used to evaluate the 
conventionality of the plan. When the metric exceeds the 
acceptable threshold, a different plan must be generated. 
Increasing problem solving rigidity will imply an 
increase in the acceptance threshold. The metric will be 
based on the total sum of the conventional rating 
associated with each integral sub-plan. 
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4.6.3.2 The Narrowing of the Attention and Perceptual 
Field 
The narrowing of the perceptual field can lead to 
important stimuli being ignored. These stimuli can be in 
the form of flashing indicators, the fast rising of a 
dial needle or even actual changes in the reading of a 
ｧ｡ｵｧｾＮ＠ There is a distinction between information and 
readings specifically requested by the operator and those 
only monitored by the operator. Generally, those readings 
requested consciously will always be registered and 
therefore, the narrowing of the attention and perceptual 
field is closely related to the general monitoring of 
data. This narrowing of perception will be modelled as 
the ignoring (see chapter 5) of changes of readings not 
specifically requested by the operator. Since monitoring 
can be modelled statistically, this effect is considered 
to be largely statistical in nature (chapter 5). 
4.6.3.3 Mindset 
In the cognitive model used by Bersini et al (16), the 
recognition of a plant state is based on similarity 
matching of the stored state frames. These plant states 
provide a state description in the form of a state label, 
which is a set of attribute values associated with the 
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diagnostic signs of a particular state. The selection of 
the frame to be instantiated (i.e., "recognized" by the 
operator) involves a detail parallel exploration of a set 
of possible frames. The attribute values which 
characterize a specific state are often in vague 
linguistic terms. Consequently, it is not expected that a 
perfect match will result. The best partially matched 
frame, which in most cases will be the frame with the 
highest support, will be selected and a plan of actions 
appropriate to the plant state associated with the 
instantiated frame will be devised and carried out. 
When the marginal support between the frames is very 
small, and/or the absolute supports for all the frames 
are low due to uncertainties in the data, the uncertainty 
concerning the correctness of the instantiated frame is 
high. When this happens, the operator will normally seek 
confirmation from the subsequent behaviour of the system. 
If, however, the behaviour of the plant becomes different 
from the expectation of the operator due to his initial 
diagnosis, the operator will conclude that a wrong frame 
has been instantiated and alternatives will be sought and 
actions more appropriate to the situation will be taken. 
When Mindset occurs, the operator will be very reluctant 
to admit that a wrong hypothesis or frame has been used 
even when the symptoms indicate otherwise. 
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Mindset can therefore be modelled by a simple increase in 
the deviation tolerance threshold and a change in the 
instantiating mechanism. In addition, the monitoring 
process will also be affected. The searching strategies 
employed in the selection of frames can be modified. For 
example, the ｨｹｾｲｩ､＠ searching mechanism, "best-
probables/breadth-first" search (i.e., breadth-first 
search is performed on the group of paths which are most 
suitable) can be changed to "best-probables/depth-first" 
search. 
4.6.3.4 Reversion to Skill-based Behaviour 
When an operator is stressed and faced with an unfamiliar 
situation, he is very likely to revert to first learnt 
behaviour. This means that he may be inclined to take a 
course of actions which he has practised many times over, 
though it is not quite appropriate to the on-going 
situation. He will prefer to do that than to devise a 
course of action specifically for that situation. The 
well practised actions are mostly actions for a well 
known situation ora group of integral actions which are 
strongly linked to each other. Therefore, this behaviour 
can be represented by the sUbstitution of the well 
documented plan associated with the frame most similar to 
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the on-going situation. Furthermore, some of the actions 
scheduled to be performed can be substituted with a 
different group of actions with strong associations with 
each other. 
The modelling of the reversion to skill-based behaviour 
places certain constraints on the underlying cognitive 
model used. It is implicit that the cognitive model must 
be able to model separately skill-based, rule-based and 
knowledge-based behaviour which are the characteristics 
exhibited by process control operators. If skill-based, 
rule-based and knowledge-based behaviour cannot be 
modelled separately by the cognitive model, it will not 
be able to facilitate a reversion of behaviour. If the 
mechanisms used in the modelling are not clearly defined, 
the boundary between the three separate behaviours cannot 
be distinguished. In view of the above requirements made 
on the underlying cognitive model, a new cognitive model 
which will satisfies all the necessary criteria is 
proposed in chapter 5. 
4.7 statistical Submodel 
All Actions errors can be classified into the following 
types: 
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Error of omission (omit step or entire task) 
Error of commission: 
Selection Error (select wrong control, misposition 
control, issue wrong command) 
Sequence Error (action carried out in wrong order) 
Time Error (too early or too late) 
Qualitative Error (too little/too much) 
Human Error Probabilities for the occurrence of each of 
the above types of errors are suggested by Swain and 
Guttmann (4). Stress and experience serve to modify these 
underlying probabilities. 
When the cognitive submodel decides on a course of 
actions, a schedule for the actions to be performed on 
the system will be issued. If no error occurs, this 
action will be translated into a low level instruction to 
the system and such an action will be effectively 
"executed" (performed by software) by the operator. In 
the statistical Submodel, the level of experience and 
stress will be used in conjunction with the fundamental 
Human Error Probabilities (HEP) to generate a HEP for the 
appropriate level of stress and experience. This 
probability distribution is then used to decide, 
probabilistically whether the action ordered by the 
cognitive submodel will be successfully completed (Figure 
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4.8). The error introduced will be of type selected 
statistically at run time. 
For omission errors, the actions will simply be ignored. 
For Selection errors, a different control will be 
substituted depending on the actual configuration of the 
control panel being used. For Sequence errors, the next 
action will be performed before the original action 
required. For Time errors, the execution of the required 
action will be delayed or put forward and, finally, for 
Quantitative errors, the magnitude value associated with 
the required action will be scaled up or down. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, a framework for modelling the effects of 
stress on the operator was proposed, and in the next 
chapter, a cognitive model suitable for use in the 
proposed modelling framework will be discussed. 
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5. The Cognitive Model 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to model the cognitive processes of a process 
control operator, two points must be borne in mind. First, 
this cognitive model must be able to model the basic human 
cognitive functions and their associated everyday errors. 
Second, it must be able to model the specific behaviour 
exhibited by the process control operators. 
Existing works (16,17) on software implementation of the 
behaviour of a process control operator have concentrated 
on the basic human cognitive processes and have produced 
encouraging results in the modelling of skill- and rule-
based behaviour. The implementation by Cacciabue et al has 
so far treated the behaviour of the operator as continuous 
and the obvious discontinuity (the switches between the 
three separate types of behaviour) has not been modelled 
explicitly. 
The cognitive model used by Cacciabue et al reflected all 
the basic characteristics of the cognitive system described 
in section 2.2, though Rasmussen's (9,18) classification of 
the three different types of behaviour is not included. As 
it is, the model allows readily for different Action error 
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mechanisms to be modelled, but the model does not offer any 
way forward for the modelling of the reversion from 
Knowledge-based behaviour to Skill-based behaviour. It is 
felt that in order for this reversion to first-learnt 
behaviour to be modelled at all, a different cognitive 
modelling approach is required. 
The cognitive processes involved in skill- and rule-based 
behaviour appear to be relatively similar but a clear 
distinction seems to exist between the cognitive processes 
associated with the knowledge-based behaviour (KB) and 
skill-/rule-based behaviour (SR-B). This model attempts to 
model these two separate categories of cognitive processing 
mechanisms by varying the models used in the modelling of 
the subprocesses such as monitoring and recognition. The 
basic conceptual architecture of this cognitive model is 
similar to the one adopted by Cacciabue et al (16,17) but 
contains major differences in the modelling of monitoring 
and recognition. 
5.2 Skill/Rule-based vs Knowledge-based Mode 
During normal operation, the major task of the operator is 
monitoring. If something unusual happens, the operator 
first of all will realise as a result of monitoring that 
the plant is operating abnormally. He will try to determine 
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the cause of the abnormality, in order to return the plant 
to its normal operating state. 
If the operator can match the symptoms of the plant readily 
and quickly to the symptoms of some known (standard) 
faults, he will have successfully "recognised" the fault. 
Once the operator recognises the fault, he will be able to 
retrieve from his memory or from some manual the relevant 
actions he is required to perform and no elaborate thinking 
will be involved. The operator will then be working in SR-B 
mode. The sequence of events leading to the SR-B mode can 
be summarised as follows: 
1) Monitoring in "normal mode" 
2) Something triggers the operator into suspecting that 
something is wrong. 
3) The operator tries to determine whether an abnormality 
has occurred. If an abnormality has occurred, the 
operator tries to match the symptoms to the symptoms of 
some known faults stored in his memory. 
4) A match is obtained and the fault is "recognised". 
5) The operator tries to retrieve from memory the actions 
associated with the fault. If a plan for that fault is 
stored in the memory, the operator will be in skill-
based mode. 
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6) No plan is stored in the memory, the operator needs to 
consult the manual and follow the instructions laid 
down in the manual. 
7) The operator is in rule-based mode. 
8) Monitoring in "abnormal mode" and performing recovery 
actions. 
It can be seen that SR-B mode is entered only after the 
abnormality is successfully recognised (matched). When the 
operator fails to recognise the fault, he will still have 
to decide on a course of actions. The operator will then 
engage in some elaborate thinking, and he will be operating 
in KB mode. It can be readily seen that the sequence of 
actions that leads to the KB mode is similar to that of the 
SR-B mode. The first four actions will still have to be 
performed by the operator but the result of action (4) will 
be different in that no "acceptable" match is made and the 
fault is not recognised. When this happens the operator 
will need to reevaluate the abnormality and select the most 
suitable course of actions. This immediate course of 
actions may belong to the associated plan of the most 
similar fault, though this fault is deemed not to be the 
on-going abnormality, or the actions will be selected 
according to some other criteria. 
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Due to the uncertain nature of the real world, there will 
always be slight variations on the strength of the symptoms 
associated with any particular fault. In fact, the symptoms 
of each fault are most likely to be described by some 
natural language descriptors that can in turn be modelled 
by using fuzzy sets. Therefore the result of the matching 
will not be a clear cut yes or no, instead it will be an 
indication of the degree of similarity between the two sets 
of symptoms. It can be readily appreciated that a threshold 
value will almost always be needed to define what 
constitutes an "acceptable match". Alternatively, frequency 
gambling, based on the frequencies of each state occurring 
in the past may be employed (16,17). 
When no match (from now on, no acceptable match will be 
referred to as no match) can be made, the operator's memory 
will have to be searched again for a suitable candidate. It 
must be clear that the searching method used in step (4) 
will no longer be suitable and some modifications are 
necessary. One of these modifications could be the lowering 
of the threshold for a match. Although this may seem 
reasonable at first sight, it is not always very 
satisfactory because symptoms associated with the 
abnormality may produce several partial matches, each with 
very similar degree of match. Obviously, a different type 
of selection mechanism must be employed. 
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It is felt that there should be two different types of 
monitoring performed by the operator, one type for normal 
operation (normal mode monitoring) and a second type 
(abnormal mode monitoring) is when the operator is aware 
that the system is functioning abnormally. Since monitoring 
involves "looking" and hence eye movements, each indicator 
can be assigned a probability of whether it is looked at a 
specific time but cannot be said categorically whether it 
will be looked at or not. Monitoring is one of the major 
roles of the operator. The operator cannot become aware of 
a certain condition if he did not see it. Regardless of how 
many red lights are flashing, indicating something is not 
working, the operator will continue to assume that nothing 
is happening if he did not notice the flashing indicator. 
Researches in psychology suggest that the methods used to 
categorise problems and the basis employed in similarity 
judgements by the problem solvers are appropriate 
characteristics for distinguishing between good and bad 
problem solvers. These same characteristics seem to be 
valid also in distinguishing between novice and experienced 
problem solvers (19). It is felt that the major differences 
between the methods used in modelling SR-B and KB behaviour 
would be in the theories of similarities used, methods of 
searching through the knowledge base, criteria for 
selection and finally the methods used for modelling 
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monitoring. These major differences between SR-B and KB 
behaviour are discussed in detail and methods for modelling 
these processes are proposed in the following chapters. 
5.3 Modellinq the Monitorinq Process 
Modern industrial systems are both large and complex. The 
level of automation and computer control is also high and 
rising. In addition, many safety features are incorporated 
into the system and this is particularly true when high 
reliability is required such as in nuclear power plant. 
These systems are designed such that even when faults do 
occur, the built in safeguards will ensure the safe and 
most probably continuous operation of the plant, because 
total stoppage will invariably result in financial losses. 
Therefore automation has shifted the role of the human 
operator in modern systems from the system operator to that 
of the system monitor. 
System monitoring demands a high level of alertness and 
vigilance, requirements that are not consistent with the 
long hours and periods of inactivity associated with 
working on a smoothly operating automated plant. Although 
automation does reduce the degree of control possessed by 
the operator and does provide some level of automatic 
monitoring, it cannot, should not and does not reduce the 
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operators' ultimate responsibility for the plant. Indeed it 
might be argued that automation reduces further the 
stimulation presented to the operator. Under these 
circumstances the sole role of the operator is monitoring 
which involves periodically scanning the system parameters 
and checking that values of these parameters are normal. If 
the system is operating in steady state, the values of 
these parameters are not expected to change very much. So, 
the main component of this monitoring is noticing changes 
from steady state values and, for the rest of this paper, 
the term "normal mode monitoring" will be used to refer to 
this particular type of monitoring. 
If a significant change in value is noticed, the operator 
may then have to decide whether the automatic controls will 
be able to cope, or it is something that requires actions 
from him. At this point, the operator will be actively 
seeking information on specific plant parameters and his 
monitoring behaviour will be different from the "normal 
mode" monitoring. The term "abnormal mode monitoring" will 
be used to refer to this type of monitoring. 
5.3.1 Monitoring and "Looking" 
Information concerning the state of the plant is displayed 
in the control room and, in addition, if something requires 
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the attention of the operator, a warning will be given. 
These warnings normally take two forms, visual or acoustic 
and in this study only visual monitoring will be modelled. 
The values of the system parameters are generally displayed 
as a dial or a digital gauge. Visual alarms generally take 
the form of charts and flashing lights etc and some of 
these may even be coupled with sound. In order to perform 
routine monitoring, the operator will need to periodically 
look at each parameter displayed in the control room. Since 
it is obvious that the operator cannot look at all these 
gauges simultaneously, due to the finite nature of his 
vision field, he must exercise a choice as to which gauge 
he will look at next. The operator, however, in normal mode 
monitoring will not be making a conscious choice. This lack 
of awareness in making a selection poses a real problem in 
the modelling of monitoring. since there is a clear 
relationship between the physical action of looking and 
monitoring, an examination of the process of eye movements 
may produce some clues. 
When there is no specific inclination to look at anything 
in particular, eye movement has been modelled successfully 
by employing statistical techniques (39 and 40). It is 
suggested here that normal mode monitoring, which is not 
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heavily directed by the mind, can be modelled 
statistically. 
Consider the case of a panel of identical indicators, 
evenly distributed on the control panel and each with equal 
importance. It is assumed here that associated with each 
indicator is a function which gives the probability of it 
being in the direct line of sight. 
These probabilities are spatially dependent, i.e., the 
position of the indicator relative to the eye will 
determine this probability. It must be stressed that these 
probabilities do not give any indication of whether the 
indicator will be "seen", it merely indicates the 
likelihood of the indicator being "looked" at. This 
probability function will be called Spatial Factor (SF). 
In addition, each indicator will have a different level of 
visual dominance, such as brightness, colour of indicator 
and frequency of flashing etc. The level of visual 
dominance will have some effect on the probability of the 
indicator being noticed if the indicator is in the direct 
line of sight. The probability distribution function due to 
visual dominance factor alone will be called Visual Factor 
(VF). 
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There are other effects that can influence this 
probability. For example, consider the case of a group of 
indicators positioned relatively close to each other and 
most of the indicators are lit up except one. When that 
indicator eventually comes on, there is a high probability 
that it may not be noticed. However, if none of the 
indicators among that group is lit up, when that same 
indicator comes on, it will have quite a high chance of it 
being registered due to its high visual dominance. This 
particular effect is difficult to model because of the 
large combination of indicator states and it implies that 
the probability distribution function VF will not remain 
static. This second order effect is not modelled in this 
study but its inclusion in future models is the next 
logical step forward. 
Finally, there is the importance the operator associates 
with each indicator. The operator may have acquired this 
association during training or gained it during actual 
operation of the plant. This association will influence the 
amount of attention the operator places on these 
indicators. However, it must be stressed that this 
influence is assumed to operate at the sUb-conscious level 
and will act only as a modification factor on the final 
probability distribution function of the indicators being 
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noticed. The distribution based on the relative importance 
of the indicators will be called Importance Factor (IF). 
During routine operation, i.e., in normal mode monitoring, 
when the values of the system parameters are not expected 
to vary much, and the Importance Factor of the indicators 
will remain more or less constant. However, when something 
abnormal happens, the operator will have an expectation of 
what indicators will come on next. He will be seeking 
confirmation and further evidence. In this case, he will be 
consciously reading certain indicators and in fact, the SF 
(shows the probability of the indicator in the line of 
sight) for the indicators will change. Therefore, it can be 
readily seen that during abnormal operation, the Importance 
Factor will also be affected. 
During abnormal operation, the operator will be monitoring 
the parameters he expects to change or perceives to be very 
important. In addition he will also need to continue 
routine monitoring. From now on, the monitoring that can be 
performed without any involvement of the operator's 
consciousness will be termed "random monitoring" and the 
ones which are influenced by the operator's consciousness 
will be termed "directed monitoring". 
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It can be readily appreciated that normal mode'monitoring 
is basically a form of random monitoring with a small 
influence from the perceived importance of individual 
indicators. It is argued here that the perceived importance 
of the indicator will only operate at the subconscious 
level. Therefore there are two separate but related 
directed monitoring processes, directed subconscious 
1 2 
monitoring and directed conscious monitoring, d and d 
monitoring respectively. Abnormal mode monitoring will be 
2 
mainly directed conscious monitoring d , with some 
contribution from random monitoring. 
The indicators are usually distributed on some control 
panels. If the indicators are indexed, we can represent the 
spatial, Visual and Importance factors associated with the 
set of indicators as three vectors, ｾＬ＠ ｾ＠ and X. ｾ＠ and X can 
vary but ｾ＠ will remain constant for a particular control 
panel configuration. It is assumed that at any given one 
time, only one indicator can be looked at. 
There are in effect three separate components to the 
monitoring processes, and each of these processes 
contribute to the probability of the indicator i to be 
registered by the operator. The individual contribution 
from each of the processes will be different. We will now 
consider the probability P for a particular 
i 
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indicator i to be registered by the operator at a given 
time, given that an indicator is looked at by the operator. 
Therefore the probability P may be written as: 
i 
1 2 
n r d d 
P = aP + PP + rp ------------(1) 
i i i i 
n 
where L P = 1 
i 
n 
P = Probability that indicator is noticed given that an 
i 
indicator is looked at by the operator and the 
monitoring performed is in normal mode. 
and a + P + r = 1 
-------------------(2) 
r 
P = Probability that indicator i is noticed given that 
i 
1 
d 
indicator is looked at by the operator operating in 
random monitoring mode. 
P = Probability that indicator i is noticed given that 
i 
2 
d 
an indicator is looked at by the operator operating 
in directed subconscious monitoring mode. 
P = Probability that indicator i is noticed given that an 
i 
indicator is looked at by the operator operating in 
directed conscious monitoring mode. 
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a = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in random mode. 
f3 = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in directed subconscious mode. 
r = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in directed conscious mode. 
Let us consider the factors which influence the value of 
P • For the value of indicator i to be registered, first of 
i 
all it must be in the line of sight of the operator. Here 
it is argued that the probability of the indicator to be 
noticed is dependent on the indicator's visual dominance, 
and its spatial position and how important the operator 
perceived it to be. 
1 2 
There are in fact two importance factor IFs, I and I . 
i i 
1 
I is the underlying importance associated with each 
i 
indicator, which the operator learnt during training and 
1 
from past experience. For each indicator i, I is a 
i 
constant and varies according to the type of system. 
2 
The second IF, I is dynamic and changes with time. Its 
i 
value is influenced by the expectation of the operator. 
For the set of indicator D = {D , D , D , ••••• D , D }, it 
123 i j 
is assumed that Random monitoring is operated without 
direct participation of consciousness. So: 
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r 
P is therefore a function of the visual dominance of 
i 
indicator i, V and the spatial factor S only. 
i i 
1 
r 
P = f(l , S ) -----------------------(3) 
i i i 
Directed subconscious monitoring depends only on the 
importance the operator acquired during training. So: 
1 
d 
P is therefore a function of the spatial factor si and 
i 
1 
its basic importance factor I only: 
i 
1 
d 1 
P = g(l , S ) -----------------------(4) 
i i i 
Since directed conscious monitoring is influenced by the 
expectation of the operator at run time. So: 
2 
d 2 
P is a function of 1 only (the dynamic importance 
i i 
factor only) because it is assumed that the operator will 
always direct his line of sight to what he expects to 
change. The operator may be considered to be seeking 
confirmation. 
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2 
d 2 
P = h(I ) ---------------------------(5) 
i i 
5.3.2 Normal Mode Monitoring 
Let us consider equation (1) in more detail (Figure 5.1). 
In normal mode monitoring, r is equal to zero because 
directed monitoring only operates at the subconscious 
level. a and p are the weights of contribution from either 
modes. So equation (1) becomes (combining equations 1, 3 
and 4): 
n 
P = af(V , S ) + pg(I , S ) ---------(6) 
i i i i i 
and a + p = 1 -------------------------(7) 
5.3.3 Abnormal Mode Monitoring 
In abnormal mode monitoring, the operator will be actively 
seeking confirmation and additional evidence. First of all, 
it is assumed that directed (conscious) monitoring will be 
the dominant factor. On the other hand, the operator will 
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still need to monitor the other important parameters 
although the he does not expect them to change (Figure 
5.2). Therefore 
1 2 
a r d d 
P = o(aP + PP ) + rp --------------(8) 
i i i i 
where o(a + P) + r = 1 
a and P hold the same value and meaning as in normal mode 
monitoring. 
o = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in normal mode. 
r = Probability that the monitoring performed by the 
operator is in directed conscious monitoring mode. 
a 
Therefore P = 6[af(V , S ) + pg(V , I )] + rh(I ) 
i i i i i i 
5.3.4 Transition Between Normal and Abnormal Mode 
Monitoring 
As described in section 2, the operator will be monitoring 
in normal mode until he suspects that something is wrong. 
He will then attempt to determine whether there is actually 
an abnormality and if an abnormality exists, he will then 
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monitor in abnormal mode. In order to model the above task 
of the operator, up to the point of realising an abnormal 
event has taken place, two points must be considered. 
First , the transition between the two monitoring modes may 
not be as straightforward as it is described above. From 
the moment the operator becomes suspicious to the time he 
becomes sure of an abnormality, his monitoring behaviour 
may be gradually changing from the direction of normal mode 
monitoring to abnormal mode monitoring. The transition in 
most circumstances will not be abrupt but for the time 
being, this transition between the two monitoring modes 
will be treated as discontinuous. This choice is made 
simply on the ground of simplicity rather than based on any 
theoretical reason. At a later date, a continuous 
transition can be introduced into the model but at the 
moment, an abrupt transition is considered to be 
sufficiently accurate in the model of the operator's 
monitoring behaviour. This continuous transition can be 
modelled by a gradual change in weighting assigned to each 
monitoring process, a, p, rand o. 
Second, some sort of triggering must be included in the 
model. For the operator to be able to "perceive" that 
something is wrong, without recognising the fault 
completely, the operator must be constantly matching the 
99 
values of the parameter to some template of normality. It 
appears that the triggering clues that the operators 
actually look for are sudden changes in any parameter 
values beyond the permitted limits. This is particularly 
true when the system is in a steady state. Therefore, in 
the model, a threshold value can be assigned to each 
parameter and whenever this threshold is exceeded, a 
"recognition" process can be initiated. This recognition 
process will involve the matching of plant values stored in 
the state frames in the knowledge-base with the current 
plant values. The modelling of the recognition process will 
be described in more detail in later sections. 
The reason for using threshold value is a simplistic one 
and is primarily intended for use in monitoring the system 
when it is in a steady state. When the system is not in a 
steady state, such as in start up or shut down manoeuvres, 
the use of threshold values is clearly not applicable 
because the values of the parameters are constantly 
changing. One suitable alternative may be to use the 
gradient of the change in parameters as a threshold. 
5.4 Modelling the Recognition Process 
Once the operator suspects that something abnormal is 
happening, he will try to determine whether he possesses 
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any knowledge about that particular abnormality. The 
operator's attempt at recognition will involve the 
searching of his memory or in this case, the knowledge 
base. 
There are four different types of knowledge concerning each 
system state. These include 
1) The symptoms which characterise a state. 
2) The appropriate response the operator must produce. 
3) The expected system behaviour after the operator has 
taken the associated ｾ｣ｴｩｯｮＮ＠
4) The evidence which negates a certain system state being . 
the probable current state. 
In this model, these four types of state information are 
stored in four types of frame and they will be referred to 
as Symptom frames, Action frames, Expectation frames and 
Elimination frames. A State frame will consist of one of 
each of the above four frames. 
The structures and functions of these frames will be 
discussed in detail in section 5.5 and only a brief 
description is given below. 
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The Symptom frames provide the values of the parameters 
which characterise a system state and these will be used in 
the initial attempt at recognising the state. 
The Action frames provide information on the required 
actions to be performed if the system is in that particular 
state. The action frames as a group contains information on 
how a task is to be carried out and they are grouped into 
different levels of abstraction. All frames which are not 
at the lowest level of abstraction can be translated into 
sequences of action of the lowest level. 
Expectation frames provide information on the expected 
behaviour·of the system after a particular action is 
performed on the system in a particular state. These 
expectation values can be in the form of system parameter 
values or gradients of change of the system parameters. 
Once the operator matches the on-going symptoms of the 
abnormality with that of a known system state, the operator 
can simply follow the instructions detailed in the 
associated Action frame and seek confirmations from the 
information provided in the Expectation frame. 
Elimination frames provide rules which can be used to 
eliminate a certain system state being valid according to 
the symptoms. The Elimination frames provide a mechanism 
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which enables a coarse grain but unambiguous selection to 
be made. The obvious trade off is accuracy. 
There are two factors which can affect the recognition 
process. First, the method of searching and second, the 
criteria for similarity, i.e., stating that there is a 
match. The searching method will place a restriction on 
the set of states to be considered by the operator and this 
is particularly important if the operator is performing 
under some time constraint. The criteria of similarity used 
will affect the eventual choice of frame and will 
subsequently influence the operator's response. As 
discussed in section 5.2, SR-B and KB modes will employ 
different searching mechanisms and similarity criteria. The 
differences in the modelling methods of the two modes are 
discussed below. 
5.4.1 The Role of similarity criteria in Skill/Rule-based 
Behaviour and Knowledge-based Behaviour 
Thibodeau et al (19) concluded in their experiments with 
physics students that the way students categorise problems 
in classical mechanics are related to problem solving 
expertise in physics. The better novice problem solver made 
more similarity judgements on the basis of deep structures 
than did poorer novice problem solvers and they also 
103 
suggested that the relationship between the use of 
principles in categorisation and problem solving skills is 
also an appropriate characteristic for making distinction 
between "good" and "bad" physics students with similar 
educational experiences. 
Novices, by definition, could not have acquired a deep 
appreciation of the subject and therefore, the novice will 
be engaged mostly in a skill/rule-based behaviour mode. 
Basically, the novices would be able to cope readily if the 
similarity between the problems they were assigned and the 
examples they were taught is very obvious. That is, the 
novices can cope adequately if they can recognise the 
problems they are assigned readily. Experts, by definition, 
possess deeper understanding of the subject and can perform 
a similarity test using deep structures. 
In several theories of human information processing, a 
distinction between automatic and controlled (or 
attentional) processes has been made (20,21,22). Automatic 
processes are assumed to occur without attention, 
intention, awareness or interference with another 
concurrent mental activity and it is a process that cannot 
be easily stopped or changed. In contrast, a controlled 
process is claimed to be dependent on the limited attention 
capacity and is affected by intention and expectation (21). 
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Shriffrin et al (41) conclude that it is not easy to 
differentiate between the two types of processes, which are 
presumably involved in all tasks. Therefore it has been 
proposed that automaticity should be applied to components 
of behaviour rather than to behaviour as a whole. This view 
is reflected in this proposed modelling method for 
skill/rule-based behaviour and knowledge-based behaviour. 
In this model, monitoring and recognition are treated as 
combinations of automatic and controlled processes. The 
switch between the automatic mode and the controlled mode 
is well defined. In the case of monitoring, the trigger is 
the perception of abnormality (section 3.4) and, in the 
case of recognition, the trigger will be a failure in 
positive identification. 
It is argued in this model that, in SR-B mode, similarity 
judgements are performed automatically and the actual 
comparison mechanism is opaque to the operator's 
consciousness. In KB mode, however, the operator will be 
aware of the selection criteria he uses. SR-B similarity 
judgement seems to conform to Wittgenstein's (23) theory of 
similarity and, for KB similarity judgement, a "negative" 
approach, namely selection by elimination, seems 
intuitively appropriate. 
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5.4.2 criteria For similarity in Skill/Rule-based 
Behaviour - Wittqenstein's Theory of similarity 
Wittgenstein's cluster account of concept similarity 
(23,24) is based on the observation that objects with 
extremely diverse properties may bear the same features. In 
his own words, 
"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 
"games". I mean board-games, Olympic games, and so 
on. What is common to them all? -- Don't say: 
"There must be something common, or they would not 
be called "games" ". -- but look and see whether 
there is anything common to all. -- For if you 
look at them you will see something that is to 
all, but similarities, relationships, and whole 
series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, 
but look! -- Look for examples at board-games, 
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to 
card-games; here you find many correspondences 
with the first group, but many common features 
drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to 
ball-games, much that is common is retained, but 
much is lost. -- Are they all :amusing"? Compare 
chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there 
winning and losing, or competition between 
players? Think of patience. In ball-games there is 
winning and losing; but when a child throws his 
ball at the wall and catches it again, this 
feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played 
by skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now 
of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the 
element of amusement, but how many other 
characteristic features have disappeared! And we 
can go through the many other groups of games in 
the same way; we can see how similarities crop up 
and disappear. And the result of this 
examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes 
similarities of detail." (23) 
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Wittgenstein's theory suggested that although we can say 
that two cases share certain features in common, we cannot 
necessarily be able to describe the relevant similarities 
in advance. This kind of similarity matching mechanism is 
akin to the one used in SR-B mode because, in both 
instances, the person performing the matching is not aware 
of the complete set of criteria used in determining 
similarity (note the difficulties involved in extracting 
the common characteristics associated with different types 
of "games" and this is thought provoking for the Knowledge 
Engineers). Nevertheless, the operator can make a 
similarity judgement fairly quickly, without resorting to 
the use of formal rules. 
In addition, from the evidence found in the research into 
problem solving (19), SR-B similarity matching may be 
utilising mostly surface features and in this case the 
values of the system parameters. Therefore, the data 
structure used to represent a particular system state 
should include a store for the value of individual system 
parameters, various combinations of these parameters and 
their weights in their contribution to the determination of 
similarity. within this formalism, two objects are 
"matched" if the similarity value of the test objects and 
the reference object is the highest amount the set of 
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reference objects and the minimum threshold value is 
exceeded. 
The similarity value is calculated according to the rules 
associated with the reference object. It is proposed that 
the implementation of similarity matching using 
wittgenstein's concept of similarity, fuzzy logic is used 
because of its suitability in representing imprecise 
knowledge and its natural ability in the handling of 
weighted contributions. 
5.4.3 criteria of similarity in Knowledge-based Behaviour 
- By Elimination and Minimisation of Risk 
It seems intuitively that in most tests of similarity, 
positive evidence supporting a match will be used and 
matching by elimination will only be employed when it is 
not possible to produce a positive match with any member of 
the available set. When an elimination mechanism is used, 
the operator will, in the majority of cases, be aware of 
the reasons for the elimination of each candidate. 
In a way, the elimination rules will be a more exact but 
perhaps less cautious form of the rules used in SR-B mode 
and in addition each rule is a conclusion. These may take 
the form of facts which must always be true when that 
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particular rule is fired. The set of conclusions obtained 
for each of the set of reference frame can then be checked 
for inconsistencies using some general knowledge-base. This 
knowledge-base contains physical principles or other common 
sense knowledge which cannot be violated. Violations at 
this level implied inconsistencies and it may be possible 
for the operator to use this information to further narrow 
down the probable choices. 
There must be an added constraint to the elimination 
selection rules. The operator will first of all limit the 
size of the reference set of frames to that of the most 
common or important ones. Secondly, he will also bear in 
mind the consequence of selecting the wrong frame. 
For example, if the present state is A and he has to make a 
choice between three frames A, Band C which are included 
in the set to be searched because of their common 
occurrence and importance. Using the elimination rules, he 
managed to rule out C and also B but he then needs to 
consider the "cost" of his decision. Of the three states, B 
is "a very important one and failure in responding correctly 
to B, such as using the recovery strategies for A and C 
will entail a high penalty perhaps in the form of loss 
revenue. The cost associated with failure to respond to A 
and C, i.e., responding with the recovery strategies for B 
109 
is not as high and is acceptable. Then the operator will 
choose B. However, the operator will also register the 
reasons, namely the "cost" angle for this selection and 
should subsequent symptoms indicate the state to be 
otherwise, he will be able to re-examine his reasoning. 
The use of a trade-off between correctness and cost is an 
intuitive one. Due to the nature of the processes the 
operator has to control, safety is in most cases the prime 
focus of the operator, particularly in this day of great 
environmental concerns. A wrong but safe decision is of 
more value and can in the majority of cases be easier to 
justify and may be preferable to the most probably right 
decision which carries a high cost if wrong. In addition, 
the operator will also have other operating directives 
which may be financial in nature. A wrong decision may 
carry a high financial penalty and could influence the 
operator's choice of actions. 
5.5 Conceptual Architecture of the cognitive Model 
The basic architecture of this proposed model is similar to 
the one used by Cacciabue et al (16). The treatment of the 
cognitive processes such as recognition and monitoring 
though is different as are the mechanisms for making a 
selection among a set of partially matched frames. 
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The basic architecture comprises three major components 
(Figure 5.3a), the Knowledge-base, the Working Memory (WM) 
and the Control Centre (CC). The knowledge base, as its 
name suggests, contains the knowledge of the operator. The 
KB can be thought of as a long term memory store in which 
the knowledge acquired is stored and can be retrieved at 
most times using some retrieval mechanism. The WM 
represents the working area of the cognitive processes and 
provide a temporary storage space for intentions etc. The 
WM can be regarded as a kind of short term memory which is 
dynamic and its content is subject to changes. The control 
centre represents the essence of cognition. It decides on 
the mechanisms used for various cognitive processes, 
initiate searches in the knowledge base and checks for 
consistencies (common sense or otherwise) etc. 
5.5.1 Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base is basically a large frame store and 
there are two categories of frames (Figure 5.3a), the state 
frames and General Knowledge frames. The state frames 
contain four separate areas of knowledge about the system. 
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1. Knowledge of the system behaviour in terms of external 
cues of the system, which may be variable behaviour and 
thresholds. 
2. Knowledge of the control of the system in terms of 
actions, tasks and procedures. 
3. The expected behaviour of the system in terms of 
variable behaviour as a result of the recommended 
control actions being taken. 
4. The rules that govern the negation of a certain state 
being relevant, in terms of system behaviour and 
variable behaviour. 
Each of the four types of knowledge concerning the system 
is represented by a separate type of frame: the Symptom 
frames, the Action frames, the Expectation frames and 
finally the Elimination frames. 
The Actions frames are organised hierarchically with many 
levels of abstraction. Each Action frame can be compiled or 
interpreted into an ordered series of basic level Action 
frames. These basic level Action frames represent one-step 
basic actions which constitute the basic building blocks of 
human activities; in other words "demons" (10). 
The General Knowledge frames contain knowledge of the 
system processes and the structure of the system in terms 
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of general physical and engineering principles. In general, 
the knowledge captured in these frames consists of system 
representations with reduced complexity where intermediate 
causal and structural links are omitted. In addition, the 
"experience" of the operator will be stored here in terms 
of "Rules of thumb", general physics knowledge such as 
conservation of mass, energy and momentum and finally the 
knowledge of when and how these physics principles should 
be applied. 
5.5.2 Working Memory 
The working memory is the working area for the cognitive 
processes. It is also the main storage place for temporary 
data. There are five separate data stores in the working 
memory and the choice of the data to be placed in them is 
decided by the Control centre (Figure 5.3a). The five 
stores are: 
1. Monitoring Mechanism store. 
The control centre will select the most relevant monitoring 
mechanism, i.e., Abnormal mode monitoring or Normal mode 
monitoring, in this store. The external environment cues 
will be filtered by the monitoring process and the 
monitoring mechanism employed will affect the admittance of 
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the system parameters into the Monitoring mechanism store 
and the admitted set of values will be used in Recognition 
(Figure 5.3b). 
2. Recognition Mechanism store. 
The CC will select the most appropriate Similarity matching 
criteria and place them in the Recognition Mechanism Store. 
The selected similarity criteria will be used in the State 
frame searching in the KB. Depending on the criteria placed 
in the store, the state frame will be selected using either 
the Symptom frame or the Elimination frame portion of the 
state frame. The successfully matched frame will be 
returned to the CC (Figure 5.3b). 
3. Current Instantiated Frame Store. 
The successfully matched frame will be placed in this store 
by the CC and the Expectation frame portion of this frame 
will be used in monitoring (Figure 5.3b). 
4. Plan of Action Store. 
The Action frame portion of the successfully matched state 
frame will be compiled into a series of basic action frames 
and this series of action frames will be stored here. These 
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actions will be taken on the system in the same order. The 
action sequence will be changing dynamically. When a new 
action is required, the sub series of basic actions 
associated with the new action is added to the original 
sequence and the order of the new sequence will be 
rescheduled (Figure 5.3b). 
5. Deduced Truth store. 
Depending on the instantiated state frame in question, a 
set of truth or facts can be deduced from the system state. 
The deduced truth set will be placed in this store and will 
be used by the control centre in conjunction with the 
general knowledge frames for consistency checking. The 
result of the consistency check will in turn influence the 
selection of the state frame (Figure 5.3b). 
5.5.3 Control Centre 
The control centre is the "soul" of the model. It 
effectively makes all the decisions based on the results 
returned from the cognitive processes. It selects the 
mechanisms for monitoring (Abnormal and Normal Mode) and 
the Similarity criteria (Wittgenstein's Cluster Theory of 
Similarity or Similarity by Elimination) to be used in the 
searching of the State frames in the knowledge base. The 
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control centre also initiates consistency checking and 
searching of the knowledge base. The only mechanism for the 
admittance of a stored unit of knowledge from the knowledge 
base to the working memory is via successful matching of 
state frames which is in turn dependent on the similarity 
criteria chosen. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The major cognitive functions demanded of the operator are 
monitoring, recognition and taking remedial actions. These 
cognitive processes are in many ways interdependent but 
they also take place in parallel. The Control Centre will 
only determine the mechanisms to be used in the Monitoring 
and Recognition processes but once these mechanisms are 
selected, these two processes can be considered as running 
independently of the Control Centre. These cognitive 
processes do communicate with each other indirectly, via 
the Current Instantiated frame store and there is direct 
interaction between the Recognition process and the Deduced 
Truth store because the data present in the Deduced Truth 
store will affect the state frame selected. 
The contents of the temporary data stored in the working 
memory will change dynamically and changes can be initiated 
by the environment cues (e.g., realizing something abnormal 
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is happening will initiate a recognition process and change 
the mechanism used for monitoring). Therefore a blackboard 
computing architecture is suitable to represent the Working 
Memory. The five temporary data stores i.e., the working 
memory, Monitoring Mechanism, Recognition Mechanism, 
Current Instantiated Frame, Plan of Action and Deduced 
Truth stores can each be represented also as a blackboard 
with the operations and processes allowed on the contents 
of these blackboards clearly defined. 
One of the major effects of stress is to cause a reversion 
from the otherwise knowledge-based mode of behaviour to SR-
B mode of behaviour. In order to model the effects of 
stress on the cognitive behaviour of the process control 
operator successfully, the underlying cognitive model used 
must in some way be able to model both knowledge-based and 
skill/rule-based modes of behaviour separately. The 
cognitive model proposed here will be used as the basis of 
work on stress modelling (25) described in chapter 6. 
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6. Application of the stress Modelling Method to the 
Cognitive Model 
6.1 Representation of Decision Errors 
The stress modelling method proposed in chapter 4 is not 
specific to any particular cognitive model but it is felt 
that the modified cognitive model in chapter 5 is more 
suitable to the representation of the cognitive effects 
caused by stress. 
The method used for the representation of Decision errors 
is independent of the cognitive models used. Under normal 
operating circumstances, when the inference mechanisms of 
the operator are not affected by stress or any other 
factors, the difference in the supports for differenct 
paths at each decision node is expected to be very large 
and the probability for the correct path to be taken will 
still be very high. In other words, the decisions made by 
the operator is still largely indistinguishable to those 
made by a "perfect" operator. 
When the operator experiences stress, the inference 
mechanism of the operator will be affected and this can 
affect the decisions made in two ways. First, the inference 
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mechanism may select an entirely different path to the one 
selected by the unstressed one. 
For example instead of producing the supports for 
conditions A and B as 0.91 and 0.09, which implies that 
path 1 is the more appropriate path, the supports produced 
becomes 0.4 and 0.6 which implies that B is the correct 
path and if a path is to be selected only on the support 
value received by each path, a wrong decision will have 
been made. 
Second, the path with the highest support may remain 
unchanged but the level of support received is changed. For 
example, in the unstressed case, the supports received by A 
and Bare 0.83 and 0.17. When the supports are combined 
with the selection likelihood associated with A and B 
respectively, ie A [.9 .1] and B [.3 .7] (Figure 4.6), the 
path selection likelihoods for the two paths become [.798 
.202]. When the operator is stressed, the supports received 
by condition A and B being true become 0.65 and 0.35. When 
the supports are combined with the selection likelihoods, 
the path selection likelihoods for the two paths become 
[.69 .31]. 
When the stress modelling method is applied to the model, 
it may be more convenient not to include the fuzzifications 
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of the decision paths in the first instant. This may be 
necessary so that changes made by the use of different and 
inaccurate inference mechanisms to the decision selected 
can be studied easily. The fuzzification of the decision 
paths may cause difficulties in the assessment of the 
effects of the changes to the inference mechanisms. 
6.2 Representation of the Degradation of Inference Ability 
In section 4.6.3, different methods for representing 
different effects on the cognitive processes have been 
proposed and here the direct application of these methods 
on the cognitive model proposed in chapter 5 will be 
ｳｵｧｧ･ｳｴｾ､Ｎ＠
6.2.1 Problem solving Rigidity 
Problem solving rigidity involves the reluctance to use 
novel solving methods. This implies that the method 
selected will be biased towards the ones which are well 
understood and tested. There may exist various alternative 
methods which can be used to achieve a goal. For example, 
there may be several ways to reduce or maintain the steam 
pressure in the primary system and some of these methods 
may be more common than others. In the knowledge base, the 
actions required in "reducing the steam pressure in the 
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primary system" will be stored in an Action frame. The 
actions detailed in the Action frames may in turn be 
detailed in other lower level Action frames until the 
actions described are all skill-based actions. 
In order to attach a conventional metric to each plan, each 
Action frame must itself contain a measurement to indicate 
its commonness. Each method for reducing the primary steam 
pressure will have associated with it, the circumstances 
for it to be used instead of the others and a measurement 
of its frequency of occurrence. When the operator is 
functioning normally, the threshold for the tolerance of 
novelty is set to be high. This means when the plan of 
actions is thought to be appropriate, the operator will 
carry out that plan regardless of its novelty and the 
conventional metric will have no effect on the actions of 
the operator. 
When problem solving rigidity sets in, the threshold for 
novelty tolerance will be decreased. If the novelties of 
the plan of actions is above the threshold value, an 
alternative plan will be generated. First, different 
methods with higher commonness value for achieving the same 
goal will be sought, and this will mean that the next most 
appropriate method will be used even though its calling 
conditions may not be satisfied entirely. 
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Secondly, if the novelty value for such an altered plan 
still exceeds the threshold value, the goal itself will 
have to be modified. If that proves to be impractical, then 
the instantiated frame will have to be changed. When the 
operator recognized a situation, a particular frame will be 
instantiated. Each frame represents a particular state of 
the plant and associated with each frame is a frequency or 
commonness value indicating the likelihood of such a fault 
occurring. In other words, when the operator cannot find a 
conventional response, he will revise his estimation of the 
state of the plant to something more common and produce a 
more conventional response. 
The onset of problem solving rigidity will only affect the 
response of the operator when an uncommon fault occurs. 
Otherwise the behaviour of the operator will not be 
affected as most novel problem methods are associated with 
the more uncommon faults. 
6.2.2 The Narrowing of the Attention and Perceptual Field 
The narrowing of the perceptual field is closely related to 
the operator's ability to monitor adequately. It is 
proposed in the cognitive model (section 5.3.1) that there 
exist three separate monitoring behaviours, namely, random 
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monitoring, directed subconscious monitoring and directed 
conscious monitoring. 
When the operator's perceptual field becomes narrower, some 
of the parameters which would have been noticed normally 
can become ignored. When this is translated into the 
language of the modelling of the monitoring processes of 
the operator, it becomes changes in the monitoring 
parameters. It is assumed that the narrowing of the 
perceptual field mainly affects routine monitoring 
performed by the operator which means that both random 
monitoring and directed subconscious monitoring can be 
affected. This restriction may be spatially related, e.g.,. 
the operator's attention may be focused on the central 
portion of the control panel. 
It is considered that the information specifically 
requested by the operator is not greatly affected. However, 
it is possible to argue that when the operator is under 
stress, he may be more ready to notice indicators which 
have a high visual dominance. In other words, the 
registration of changes in the parameters specifically 
requested by the operator may be more susceptible to the 
variation in visual dominance. 
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There may be some indicators whose importance is so great 
that any change in their value will definitely be noticed 
by the operator. These indicators can be programmed as 
"call by value" and whenever their value changes, a message 
is sent to the operator to cause the change to be noticed. 
The narrowing of the perceptual field may also cause this 
automatic message sending to be disrupted. 
The narrowing of the perceptual field generally involves 
changes in the monitoring parameters a, p, rand 6, and the 
three actual probability distribution functions associated 
with the three separate componets of monitoring: 
1 2 
r d d 
p ,P and P 
iii 
The actual assignment of the values will depend on the 
physical configuration of the construction panel and the 
perception of the operator. These values should be obtained 
by close consultation with the operators. 
6.2.3 Hindset 
The modelling method suggested in section 4.6.3.3 can be 
readily applied to the present cognitive model. The 
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deviation tolerated by the operator can be increased before 
the instantiated frame is rejected. In addition, the 
monitoring behaviour of the operator should be dominated by 
the directed conscious mode of monitoring. 
This is because the operator is quite convinced that the 
instantiated frame is the correct frame and therefore will 
be actively seeking confirmation rather than looking for 
contradictions. The dominance of the directed conscious 
monitoring mode coupled with the increase in the tolerance 
of deviation will cause the operator to abandon a false 
hypothesis at a much later stage than otherwise. 
6.2.4 Reversion to Skill-based Behaviours 
When knowledge-based behaviour occurs, it usually means 
that some degree of independent thinking is required. The 
operator will have to assess the situation for himself and 
seek confirmation for the hypothesis he produced. The 
engagement in knowledge-based behaviour mode implies that 
something is not readily recognizable or common, because 
otherwise the operator would have been able to recognize 
the situation immediately and use the remedial methods 
learnt in training to cope with the situation. 
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The operator will have made some intermediate plans of 
actions to perform on the system. Some of these actions may 
be less frequently used or practised. Skill-based 
behaviours are those which are very well practised and a 
reversion to skill-based behaviour can be modelled by using 
the most similar and more frequently practised actions. In 
some instances, it may be that a sequence of actions which 
are called for are not often used and in others, it is the 
actual fault that is very rare. In the extreme case, the 
reversion to skill-based behaviour can cause the wrong but 
nevertheless similar plan of actions to be used instead. In 
this case, the monitoring behaviour will also be affected. 
In effect, the directed conscious monitoring will be biased 
towards the parameters detailed in the Expectation frames 
associated with the substituted frame. 
It must be emphasised that the instantiated frame though 
should remain the one selected by the operator. Although 
the operator substituted his actions with a group of more 
familiar actions, he is essentially aware of what the on-
going situation is. Therefore, at some point, the operator 
should revert back to the original plan of actions though 
it cannot be said with certainty at which point the 
operator will do this. 
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6.2.5 Experience 
As mentioned in approximation (7) in section 4.5, the only 
effect of experience is to increase the size of the 
knowledge base available to the operator. This 
approximation is for ease of conceptualization and 
implementation of the cognitive model. 
In this model, experience will increase the size of the 
knowledge base in the following ways: 
1. Each subsystem may have certain physical laws which are 
particularly appropriate to it. For example, the 
pressuriser may have associated with it, the law of the 
conservation of mass, phase transition laws and the gas 
laws etc. In order to satisfy each law, the system must 
conform to a certain configuration or assumption. The 
violation of a particular law or laws will imply that a 
certain condition exists in the subsystem. For an 
experienced operator, he can use this extra knowledge 
to check for the integrity of the sUbsystem. This type 
of checking is particularly useful when the fault is 
not a standard one and conflicting information is 
received by the operator. An experienced operator can 
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use this extra knowledge to attempt to resolve the 
conflicts. When an the operator is an inexperienced 
one, such knowledge will not be available to him. 
2. When the situation is not developing in ways expected by 
the operator, he will begin to suspect that some 
assumptions must be wrong. This is particularly true 
when there is an equipment failure. Experienced 
operators will have, due to past encounters, feelings, 
for the relative likelihood of different component 
failures. This information is important to the 
operator because the operator can examine the more 
likely hypothesis first and can result in savings in 
the time taken for diagnosis. 
3. The experienced operator will know when to initiate a 
particular constraint checking. First for all, the 
operator will need to recognize the symptoms which 
indicate the need for constraint checking. The physical 
laws associated with different subsystems only serve to 
indicate which physical laws are appropriate to the 
subsystem but in themselves do not provide any 
indication on when these laws should be checked. On the 
other hand it is not possible to perform constant 
constraint checking as this would prevent the operator 
performing at a reasonable speed. 
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This interpretation of the role of experience carries 
certain implications on the implementation of the cognitive 
model (the Program). The implemented cognitive model will 
have to perform constraint checking as a matter of course. 
The constraint checking method takes the following form: 
1. The Program will check in the reserved experience 
section of the knowledge base for any particular 
calling conditions for constraint checking initiation. 
If there is none, as in the case of an inexperienced 
operator, no constraint checking is expected unless 
called for by the core knowledge base. This implies 
that constraint checking can still be performed as 
trained but the operator will not be able to start the 
constraint checking on his own initiative. 
2. The general knowledge of physics is available to all the 
operators as should be the case. However, in the 
reserved experience section, the physical laws which 
are applicable to a subsystem are grouped together. 
When there is a perceived problem and constraint 
checking is called for, the experienced operator will 
know which are the essential laws to check for a 
particular subsystem and as a result will be able to 
diagnose the problem quicker than an inexperienced 
129 
operator, who may not have such short cuts available to 
him. 
3. The relative likelihood for different components 
failures and faults will also be stored in the reserved 
experience section of the knowledge base. 
In actual fact, the experience section of the knowledge 
base may remain static and contain the extra knowledge from 
a very experienced operator. The experience section can 
then be partitioned into many levels and the access to 
different levels of the experience knowledge base will be 
controlled by the experience level "clearance" of the 
operator (Figure 4.7). This configuration is particularly 
attractive because changes in the experience of the 
operator to be modelled will not necessitate changes in the 
experience section of the knowledge base. 
6.2.6 Assessing stress Levels and Associated Effects 
The effects of stress on the cognitive behaviour of the 
operator have agreed on several aspects, as discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4. The findings from these effects 
(2,8,11,12,13,14) do not provide any indication on the 
relative degree of the known effects of stress. 
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Therefore although it is known that the operator's 
perceptual field will be narrowed, it is not at all certain 
whether this will be a dominant effect or whether this 
narrowing of perceptual field will always happen when the 
operator experiences stress. 
Although cognitive effects of stress can be modelled as 
described in chapter 6, the relative degree of each effect 
is not known and as a result, in the implementation of the 
operator model, the relative importance of these effects 
will have to assigned initially. In addition, there is no 
indication in the findings of the stress research on the 
level of stress required for these cognitive effects to 
appear. 
Before a different degree of cognitive effects can be 
associated with a particular stress level, the stress 
levels associated with different states of the plant have 
to be found. Generally speaking, stress measurement falls 
into three categories: subjective, behavioural and 
physiological (14). 
Physiological stress measurements as its name suggests 
measures stress as a physiological response to stress. 
Different physiological parameters are closely related to 
the stress level experienced by an individual, namely heart 
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rate, skill response and muscle tension etc (14). 
Physiological measures are difficult to fake but are more 
difficult to obtain during operating conditions. 
Behavioural measurements of stress map the level of stress 
experienced with the performance of the operator and allows 
assessments of the ways in which performance can be 
degraded when the subject is placed under stress. 
Degradation in performance is not sufficient evidence for 
the presence and levels of stress though and should be used 
with care (14). 
Finally, subjective measurements of stress rely on the 
perceived level of stress perceived by the operator. This 
measurement of stress is consistent with the definition of 
stress adopted in chapter 4 (section 4.1). In addition 
stress is a personal reaction and it is considered that 
subjective measurements of stress is more appropriate here. 
It is proposed that a notional scale of stress levels 
should be used here. For each plant situation, there will 
be associated with it a stress level. These stress levels 
are to be obtained from the operator. Since the rating of 
different plant situations into different stress levels is 
effectively a discriminal process, it is proposed that 
Thurstone's Paired Comparison method (29 and 51· ) is 
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appropriate here (Appendix A). 
After a notional scale of stress level is obtained, various 
combinations of cognitive effects of stress can be assigned 
for different stress levels. 
6.3 summary 
In this chapter, the application of the modelling methods 
for the effects of stress,to the proposed cognitive model 
was discussed and in the next chapter, a software 
architecture suitable for the implementation of the 
cognitive model is suggested. 
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7. Architecture Design 
7.1 Introduction 
The modelling techniques proposed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
are complex. The modelling method proposed in the modelling 
of the behaviour of a process control operator contains 
many new modelling techniques. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to assess the success of each new technique 
individually without full implementation of the cognitive 
model. 
In this chapter, an architecture design that defines the 
architecture of a software system will be provided. This 
architecture supports a modular approach to the 
implementation of the cognitive model. In addition, it will 
support the anticipated experimentations with various model 
implementation techniques. 
In this chapter, ｴｨｾ＠ functionality of each module will be 
defined and a top-down approach is adopted in the design. 
It is not considered appropriate to provide a detail 
implementation design here and the architecture design is 
complete when the system is decomposed into individual 
components where a detail implementation design can 
proceed. At this point, the relationship between each 
component of the system will have been provided and in some 
cases, algorithms will also be proposed. 
The techniques used in describing the architecture design 
can be found in (28). 
7.2 The system 
Before deciding on the tools/methods used in the 
implementation of the system, ｴｾ･＠ following points must be 
borne in mind. 
1. Due to the complexity involved in the model, the maximum 
degree of freedom and control over the implementation 
of the model is needed. In addition, the cognitive 
model itself, as well as the modelling methods for the 
effects of stress utilise the uncertainties involved in 
the inference processes. Therefore, it seemed that an 
artificial intelligence language which supports easy 
handling of uncertainties should be used instead of an 
artificial intelligence toolkit. 
2. One of the major criteria of the operator model is to be 
able to produce credible behaviour of a process control 
operator. Therefore, the implementation of the operator 
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model must, at the very least, be able to control a 
simulation of the process. 
3. Finally, for the reason of assessment and validation of 
the model, the interaction between the operator model 
and the simulator should be monitored. 
7.2.1 Uncertainties Handling Requirement 
Bearing the above points in mind, it is suggested here that 
the artificial intelligence language FRIL (31) should be 
used. FRIL provides a sophisticated representation of 
uncertainties in the form of support logic programming. 
Support logic programming is based on fuzzy logic and FRIL 
allows everyday concepts such as "reasonably", "very" and 
"fairly" to be represented as fuzzy sets with ease. Fuzzy 
logic provides a useful method in handling uncertainties 
and with care can be very accurate in representing human 
knowledge. Fuzzy logic handling and fuzzy set 
representation are integral parts of FRIL and therefore, 
the amount of programming required for uncertainties 
handling is reduced by a large amount. 
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7.2.2 controlling A Simulator 
FRIL provides a very versatile foreign language interface 
for C, which can in turn be used to provide links with any 
Fortran program. This capability of FRIL means that any 
simulation can be "extended" or incorporated into FRIL. 
This means that the software version of the operator can 
issue a direct command to the simulator within FRIL and no 
hardware will be required to link the operator model and 
the simulator. 
7.2.3 context Diagram 
The highest level description of the system is given in 
Figure 7.1. The architecture design starts from this 
diagram. The monitor component will not be included in the 
design because at its simplest level, the monitor needs to 
only log the time when events happen and all the commands 
issued by the operator module. The degree of monitoring 
functions required is very much dependent on the choice of 
the implementor of the model and the experimentation 
required. 
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7.3 Simulator in FRIL (Module 1) 
The process of including a simulator in FRIL is represented 
in Figure 7.2. This process involves using the Foreign 
Language Interface provided by FRIL (31). 
The simulator program, which can be in either Pascal or 
Fortran, is first compiled in to object code. The interface 
routine required by FRIL is written by the implementor in 
c. The interface routines are complied into object code. 
Finally, the file describing the mapping of the Fortran 
functions used to control the simulator to FRIL predicates 
should be provided. 
The object codes of FRIL, the simulator, the interface 
routines and the mapping of functions and predicates are 
fed to the foreign language interface. The output will be a 
new version of FRIL with an embedded simulator (Module 1). 
The functions used to control the simulator can be accessed 
via the mapped FRIL predicates as if they were provided by 
the system. 
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7.4 The Operator (Module 2) 
The inputs to the operator module are visual and audio 
plant signals available to a human operator. The outputs 
from this module are actions to be performed on the 
simulator. 
The operator module can be further decomposed into three 
modules. These are monitoring (module 2.1), recognition 
(module 2.2) and the get action and expectation (module 
2.3) modules (Figure 7.3) 
The inputs to the monitoring module are the incoming plant 
signals and the expectation frame. The output from the 
module is a current symptom frame. The function of the 
monitoring module is to produce a symptom frame, using the 
current value of the simulator parameters. The relevant 
expectation frame is used in performing monitoring. 
This current symptom frame serves as input to the 
recognition module. The function of this module is to 
decide which state the system is in. The recognition module 
will use the current symptom frame, together with the 
recognition algorithm used at the time to make a decision. 
The recognition module searches through the symptom frames 
and elimination frames in the knowledge base in order to 
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"Knowledge -
Base 
make a decision on the state of the simulator. The output 
from the recognition module is the current instantiated 
frame which represents the current state of the simulator. 
The current instantiated frame serves as input to the get 
action and expectation module. The function of this module 
is to retrieve from the knowledge base, the associated 
actions the operator needs to perform when the system is in 
the current instantiated frame. In addition, this module 
will retrieve the expectation frame associated with the 
current instantiated state and the expectation frame will 
be used by the monitoring module to perform the next 
monitoring operation. 
7.5 The Monitoring Module (Module 2.1) 
The monitoring process (Figure 7.4) can be further 
decomposed into the following modules, the weighted input 
filter (module 2.1.1), the natural language interpreter 
(module 2.1.2) and the frame compiler (module 2.1.3). 
The function of the weighted input filter (Figure 7.5) is 
to select which plant signals will be registered by the 
operator. The actual filtering is dependent on what signal 
changes are expected by the operator, the stress level the 
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operator is experiencing and the selection mechanism 
operating at the time. 
The selection mechanism in operation is the mode of 
monitoring the operator is in, which may be a weighted 
mixture of the three different modes of monitoring 
described in section 5.3. The output from the weighted 
input filter is a set of simulator signals which will be 
registered by the operator. The current value of this set 
will be used with the other plant parameters to form the 
current symptom frame. 
The function of the natural language interpreter is to 
convert the numerical value of the plant parameters into 
the natural language descriptors used by the human 
operator. This conversion is necessary because the 
knowledge obtained from the human operator and hence the 
knowledge in the knowledge base is in the form of a natural 
language descriptor. For example, the pressure may be 
described by the human operator as high and rising. This 
same form of knowledge representation will also have been 
used in the description of a state. The natural language 
interpreter will be used to convert the signals supplied by 
the simulator, such as 100 C/min into temperature rising 
very rapidly. 
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The frame compiler uses the interpreted new parameter 
values together with the previous symptom frame and produce 
a current symptom frame. This current symptom frame can 
then be used in the recognition process, using a user 
defined frame matching algorithm. 
7.6 The Recognition Process (Module 2.2) 
The function of the recognition module is to determine 
which state the plant is actually in. The input to this 
module is the current symptom frame. The recognition module 
can be further decomposed into two modules, the selection 
process (module 2.2.1) and the matching process (module 
2.2.2). 
The selection process decides which similarity matching 
mechanism to use on the basis of the acceptance level 
produced as a result of the similarity matching process. 
The output of this module is the selected similarity 
criteria that will be used by the matching process. 
The matching process (module 2.2.2) will match the current 
symptom frame against the symptom reference frames or the 
elimination frames in the knowledge base, depending on the 
similarity criteria selected at the time. 
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7.7 Get Action and Expectation Module (Module 2.3) 
The function of this module is to retrieve from the 
knowledge base, the actions the operator must perform when 
the plant is in a state represented by the current 
instantiated frame (Figure 7.6). This module can be further 
decomposed into the following modules, the retrieve action 
frame module (module 2.3.1), the retrieve expectation frame 
module (module 2.3.2), the high level action scheduler 
(module 2.3.3), the low level action compiler (module 
2.3.4) and the action interpreter (module 2.3.5) 
The input to the retrieve action frame module and the 
retrieve expectation frame module is the current 
instantiated frame. Both modules will search through the 
knowledge base and the output from these two modules will 
be the relevant action frame and expectation frame. 
The expectation frame will be used as input to the 
monitoring module (module 2.1). The action frame retrieved 
by this module will describe actions at a higher conceptual 
level. For example, the action frame may contain actions 
such as "lower pressure level in primary circuit", or 
"check for constraint violation". These high level actions 
will serve as input to the high level action scheduler, 
whose function is to assign priorities to each action. 
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It is anticipated that the scheduling of actions performed 
by this module will be based on the actual rules of thumb 
used by the human operator. No attempt is made to utilise 
the current know-how in solving scheduling problems. The 
emphasis is on the modelling of operator behaviour and not 
on scheduling efficiency. 
The output from the high level action scheduler is a high 
level schedule. This schedule serves as the input to the 
low level action compiler. This compiler will retrieve from 
the knowledge base the recipe to achieve the higher level 
actions. 
The high level action schedule can be equated to the rule 
based behaviour level and the low level action schedule is 
equivalent to skill-based behaviour. 
Finally, the action interpreter translates the actions 
required to perform from the language of the operator to 
that required by the simulator. The predicates used to 
control the simulator were determined in the 
predicate/function map used in producing the combined FRIL 
and Simulator Module. 
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7.7 Example Implementation of similarity Hatchinq Based on 
Wittqenstein's Theory of similarity 
FRIL does not provide 'any object oriented programming tool. 
In order to represent system states, different levels of 
action' frames and symptom frames easily, object oriented 
programming techniques need to be used. In addition, the 
nature of the cognitive model requires that inheritance to 
be supported. 
An experimental software package, which enables object-
oriented programming methods to be used in FRIL has been 
produced. This package provides predefined data objects, 
such as reference frames. The package supports similarity 
matching for frames based on Wittgenstein's theory of 
similarity. since the knowledge used in Wittgenstein's 
Cluster similarity matching is not visible to the operator, 
this package has been designed to perform knowledge hiding. 
The local knowledge used in this matching will be removed 
by the system immediately after matching is performed and 
as such will provide automatic maintenance of the knowledge 
base. 
This package is called OBJ-IV and runs under FRIL (Version 
4). A programming manual, source code and examples are 
provided in Appendix B. Examples are given in this section 
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on possible representation techniques for the symptom 
frames and elimination frames only. For syntax of the 
package, refer to Appendix B and for a detail explanation 
of the meaning of the support pairs refer to (31). 
7.7.1 Example Symptom Frame 
Two classes are supplied by the OBJ-IV and these are 
ref_frame and frame. A ref_frame is specialised version of 
a frame and it contains special information that are used 
determine whether any given frame describes the entity 
described represented by the ref frame. 
In this example, a class called mammal is defined. A mammal 
is a frame and associated with this mammal frame is a set 
of valid attributes associated with mammals. These are 
intelligence, hair, size, legs, hands, appetite, nose_size 
and tail. Each of these attributes can take different 
values that are special to that particular mammal. 
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The class mammal will be defined as follows: 
(isa mammal frame) 
(def_obj mammal (intelligence 
hair 
size 
legs 
hands 
appetite 
nose size 
tail» 
An additional class called mammal ref is defined. 
Mammal_ref is a mammal and also a ref frame. This means 
automatically that , each instance of mammal_ref contains 
information which characterises this particular mammal and 
the built-in similarity matching method can be used. The 
class mammal ref is defined as: 
(isa mammal ref mammal ref_frame) 
One instance of mammal_ref, human is defined. The 
characteristics of a human being are: 
High intelligence, possesses little body hair, body size is 
medium (compare with all mammals), has two legs, has 
hands, is an ominvore, has small nose (compare to an 
elephant) and has nQ tail. 
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The knowledge of how an expert decides whether a mammal is 
human, i.e., the different similarity criteria are 
1. If the mammal is highly intelligent and has no tail, it 
is very likely that it is a human. On the other hand if 
it is not then it is not likely that it is human. 
2. If the mammal has two hands and two legs, and it eats 
both meat and vegetable, but some may be vegetarians, 
it is fairly likely that it is human. Otherwise, there 
is still a fair chance that it is human. 
3. If the mammal has very little body hair, with a small 
body size, two legs and a small nose, there is a fairly 
likely that it is human. Otherwise there is fair chance 
that it is human. 
4. If the mammal has no tail, it is very likely that it is 
human otherwise there is very little chance that it is 
human. 
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The above knowledge is translated and represented in the 
mammal_ref frame as: 
(generate human mammal ref 
(intelligence high) 
(hair little) 
) ) 
(size medium) 
(legs two) 
(hands yes) 
(appetite omnivore) 
(nose_size small) 
(tail none) 
(mini_expert 
(begin 
(and intelligence tail 
(supp « 0 • 8 1) (0. 0 0.35»» 
(and hands legs 
(or appetite (appetite herbivore» 
( supp « 0 . 4 1) (0. 2 O. 6) ) ) ) 
(and hair size legs nose size 
(supp « 0 • 4 1) (0.2 O. 6"» ) ) 
(and tail (supp «0.8 1) (0 0.2»») 
end) 
For any rule represented in FRIL, two support pairs can be 
assigned. 
( (Fact_A) 
(Fact_B) ) ( (a b) (c d» 
This rule means that if Fact_B is true, there is a minimum 
support of a for Fact_A being true and there is a possible 
support of Fact_A being true. 
If Fact B is not true, there is a minimum support of c for 
Fact_A being true and a possible support of d being true. 
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Two instances of mammal, Peter and monkey are generated. It 
is fairly certain Peter is highly intelligent, very certain 
that he has little body hair, with medium size body, two 
legs, a vegetarian, has a small nose and no tail. 
For monkey, it is certain that he is only of medium 
intelligence. He has a lot of body hair, with medium body 
size, two legs, has hands, and eats both meat and 
vegetables. He has a small nose and also a tail. 
Both Peter and Monkey will be represented as instances of 
the mammal frame as below: 
(generate Peter mammal 
) 
(intelligence (high supp (0.8 1») 
(hair (little supp (0.9 1») 
(size (medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 If» 
(appetite (herbivore supp (1 1) 
(nose_size (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (none supp (1 1») 
(generate monkey mammal 
) 
(intelligence (medium supp (1 1») 
(hair (a_lot supp (1 1») 
{size {medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 1») 
(appetite (omnivore supp (1 1») 
(nose_size (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (yes supp (II») 
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A built in method for ref_frame and frames can be used to 
decide whether Peter and monkey are human. 
«compare_frame monkey human X) (pp X» 
(0.4 1) 
This means that there is a minimum of 40% support for 
monkey being human. 
«compare_frame Peter human X) (pp X» 
(0.8 1) 
This means that there is a minimum support of 0.8 for Peter 
to be a human being. 
It can be readily seen that the above frame representations 
and frame matching can be used as symptom frames and 
ref frames can be used as symptom ref frames. The criteria 
used for determining similar frames can be stored in the 
mini_expert section of the ref_frame and frame matching can 
be performed by using the built-in method compare_frame. 
7.7.2 Example Elimination Frame 
Elimination frames can be represented by using the 
predefined ref frame representation. This can be achieved 
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by using the second support pair allowed in the mini_expert 
section of the ref frame. 
For example, if we define a frame called mammal_elimination 
(generate human mammal elimination 
(intelligence •••••• ) 
) ) 
( ..................) 
(mini_expert 
(begin 
(and (appetite omnivore) 
(supp «0 1)(0.0 0.3»» 
(and tail (supp «0 1) (0 0»» 
end» 
This means that if the mammal is not an omnivore, there is 
only a maximum possible support of 0.3 for it to be a 
human. If the mammal has a tail, there is only no chance 
for it to be a human. 
7.9 Discussion 
The architecture design is based on a modular approach and 
in some ways can be treated as a blackboard system. The two 
major processes performed by the operator are monitoring 
and recognition. Although different mechanisms for 
performing the two processes are used in the model, the 
functions of these processes remain unchanged. 
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The modular approach adopted in this architecture design 
will allow alternative mechanisms to be tried. 
Modifications to the implementation of a mechanism, or to 
the model of the underlying mechanisms used will not 
necessitate drastic revision to the codes. 
In addition, a modular approach will also support a 
partitioned experience knowledge mentioned in chapter 6. A 
modular architecture will also enable different modelling 
techniques for monitoring and recognition to be 
experimented without requiring a drastic change to the 
code. 
It must be emphasised that the implementation will only be 
a discrete version of the operator model. In the operator 
model, it is implied that the monitoring and, recognition 
can be performed in parallel and in fact, this innate 
parallelism is hinted in some psychology literature. It is 
obvious that the implementation will not be able to perform 
different processes in a truly parallel fashion and 
approximations will have to be taken. The effects of such 
approximations should be considered after the knowledge on 
operating the plant is elicited and certainly before the 
actual implementation takes place. 
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8. Conclusions 
The objective of this work (Section 1.2) is to produce a 
formal framework for the evaluation of .the reliability of a 
system when the operator is affected by stress. It is 
expected that the framework will enable a computer 
simulation of an operator, built to cognitive 
specifications, to be constructed. This software can then 
be interfaced with a plant simulator and the whole system 
can be used as tool to study the overall system 
reliability. 
The modelling methods proposed in Chapter 4, together with 
the cognitive model proposed in Chapter 5 together have met 
the objective of this research work. This research work has 
produced a new cognitive model that can account for the 
behaviour of a process control operator under stress 
through the amalgamation of Reason's cognitive model of 
error (10) and Rasmussen's process control operator model 
(9). This new cognitive model represents this work's 
contribution to knowledge. Although the example used in the 
development of the new cognitive model is a nuclear power 
plant operator, the modelling framework developed in this 
work is essentially generic, and can be mapped into other 
areas of process control, with a particular relevance to 
power control. 
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In addition, work has started towards producing the 
simulation tool for the study of overall system 
reliability. A simulator of a nuclear power plant has 
already been incorporated into our version of FRIL, as 
described in Figure 7.2. All the interfaces necessary for 
the software "operator" to control (via software commands) 
the nuclear power plant are already in place. I have 
implemented OBJ-IV, an object oriented extension to FRIL, 
to support the use of various similarity matching criteria 
described in Chapter 5 (Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). OBJ-IV 
allows object oriented programming methods to be used 
within a fuzzy logic programming environment. I recommend 
that the next area for closer investigation and 
implementation to be qualitative modelling methods for use 
in the modelling of experience. 
The modelling exercise has produced some solutions to the 
modelling of the effects of stress but it has also raised 
many more questions. The modelling methods proposed are 
primarily for a single cognitive entity. In reality, 
operators work together as a group in the control room. In 
the case of a nuclear power plant control room, a team of 
operators on shift duty in the control room are lead by a 
shift operator. The shift operator is actually in charge of 
the overall control of the plant. It is observed that the 
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shift operator actually issues instructions to be carried 
by other operators. During operation, it is the shift 
supervisor who is responsible for the ultimate 
interpretation of the plant symptoms and is also 
responsible for determining actions to be performed on the 
plant. 
In view of the general operational practice, it is 
reasonable to treat the shift supervisor as the operator to 
be modelled. The actions to be performed on the system are 
very often carried out by other operators. The monitoring 
of the system parameters are also performed by other 
operators. One of the major tasks of the supervisor, it is 
argued here, is recognition. The supervisor will delegate 
some lower level of responsibility such as "monitoring the 
steam pressure" or "maintain the water level" to other 
operators. Indeed, it may be possible that some degree of 
freedom is available to the other operators in the carrying 
out the instructions from the shift supervisor. 
One of the important aspects concerning the behaviour of a 
group is the communications between individual members of 
the group. Depending on the effectiveness and the adequacy 
of the communication links, errors due to misinterpretation 
and misunderstanding can occur. 
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The implemented operator model can be modified in order to 
study this group behaviour. The changes involved will not 
be difficult to achieve for group actions to be studied. 
The training of process control operators is both time 
consuming and expensive. Mistakes in the design of the 
training of the operators will be costly to remedy and 
indeed may be difficult, as the common saying, "old habits 
die hard", seems to suggest. In addition, once a cognitive 
demon is formed and confirmed, habit intrusions and 
reversion to first learnt behaviour can become a real 
problem. 
It may be possible to implement the procedures and the 
reasoning required of the operator in the control of a new 
process control plant using the cognitive model and stress 
modelling methodologies proposed. This implementation can 
then be used to test for ambiguities in the training design 
and if ambiguities do exist, the training methods can be 
redesigned before training starts. 
There remain many problems to be addressed before such a 
tool can become reality. The implementation of the 
cognitive model is by no means trivial. Some of the 
problems associated with the implementation of the 
cognitive model are closely related with the general 
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problems of Artificial Intelligence, particularly how to 
model deep knowledge. There are also many problems 
associated with knowledge acquisition and representation in 
general. Finally, the last but least problem which has to 
solved is the validation of the model and effective 
validation methods have to be found and agreed upon. 
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Appendix A 
The Method of Paired Comparison 
This method makes use of the human judgement ability in obtaining a 
ranking or scaling of a given set of items with respect to a 
specified attribute. In this case it is the stress associated with 
different incidents that is being scaled. 
The items are presented in all combinations of two and the subject 
has to decide which member of the pair presented are greater or 
smaller with respect to the attribures to be scaled. 
n For n incidents, the complete set of pairs will be C2, 
Number of all possible combinations = nC2 
n(n-l) 
2 
In order to produce a statistically usable set of results, the 
entire process has to be repeated many times. The same subject can 
be used for each assessment. This comparison positions stimuli 
along a psychological continuum which is in fact the first of the 
postulates of Thurstone's law of comparative judgement. "Each 
stimulus when presented to an observer gives rise to a discriminal 
process which has some value on the psychological continuum of 
interest" 
The scale obtained in this way will be a notional scale with the 
highest rated attributed as "1" and the lowest rated one as "0". 
The second postulate asserts that "because of momentary 
fluctuations in the organism this notional scale value will vary." 
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Vhen the same stimuli are presented to the same observer a large 
number of times, the distribution of the scale will be 
approximately Gaussian in form. 
The mean and standard deviation of such a distribution are termed 
the mean scale value, ｾＬ＠ and the discriminal dispersion, a. 
Figure A.l. 
Consider two such distributions with mean scale values ｾｪ＠ and ｾｫ＠
along the psychological continuum of interest. The observer will 
exercise a discriminal process and assign notional scale values, dj 
and dk ' to the two stimuli. The difference between these two 
values will produce the instantaneous discriminal difference, djk• 
As the difference between two Gaussian distribution is also a 
Gaussian distribution, the mean scale distribution is also a 
Gaussian distribution The mean scale separation between two 
stimuli, j and k, is given 
by 
However, as the distribution of the two discriminal process will 
overlap, some of the discriminal differences will be negative. This 
means that when the pair of stimuli (j and k) is presented to the 
observer a number of times, the observer will rate j as higher than 
k sometimes and the reverse is also true. 
The proportion of occasions when the observer reverses his 
judgement will be proportional to the area of overlap between the 
two distributions. Figure A.2. 
(see Figure A.1) 
The pairs of stimuli must be presented in such a way that the 
observer will not be able to remember his previous choices. 
If k is rated higher than j fk out of f times (fk If)when the pairs 
(j,k) were presented, then 1 - fk/f is proportional to the shaded 
area (Figure A.1). The shaded area in fact is proportional to the 
probability that k is less than j and fk/f is proportional to the 
probability that k is greater than j. 
Probability that k is greater j is 
1 r 1 [ -(Pk · P(k>j) = exp J 12ft O'kj 0 
where double subscript kj :: k - j 
make the substitution 
z = ----- and dz = 
P(k>j) _1_ Ja> exp (_ 'bz') dz 
12ft 0 
- dkj ) 2 
20'kj 
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1 
d(dkj ) 
when dkj 0, z ( 
0) 
P(k>j)= __ 1 __ j exp(- ｾｚＲＩ＠ dz 
12p 
-xkj 
1 
12p j xk' e:p<- 'hz 2 ) dz 
- CD 
ie: unit, zero mean, normal distribution. 
Thus, in reverse, if it is known that P(k>j) = 0.7 (say) then from 
a normal distribution table xkj = 0.52 can be found and from 
which ｾｫｪ＠ can be calculated in this case, ｾｫｪ＠ = 0.52 • ukj 
From basic statistics, the standard deviation of the difference 
distribution, ukj can be obtained from the standard deviations of 
the two processes, uj and uk. 
ie: 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • (1) 
ｾｫｪ＠ the mean separation along the psychological continuum for 
process i 
and j 
the discriminal dispersion for processes j and k 
the unit normal deviate corresponding to the probability 
that k is rated higher than j 
r jk the correlation coefficient for discriminal processes dj 
and dk 
For n stimuli,nC2equations of the form of equation (1) will be 
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V. scale value a 
J 
Figure A.I. Gaussian Variation of Discriminal Processes 
-------
Q VkJ 
scale ciiffeI'ence 
d 
kJ 
Figure A.2. The Distribution of Differences For Discriminal Process 
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produced, ie. n(n - 1)/2. However, for n stimuli, there are (n - 1) 
intervals, n discriminal dispersions, and n(n - 1)/2 correlation 
coefficients to be found. It can be readily seen that just n(n -
1)/2 equations on their own are not sufficient to obtain the 
notional scale. Thus the law of comparative judgement is not 
solvable without making some assumptions. 
First, if a different observer is used for each repeated test, it 
seems fair to assume that r jk ｾ＠ 0 for all jk. This is because the 
decisions for each (j,k) pairs are derived ·from different 
individual psychological continua. If the population of observers 
are closely influenced by each others view, such as they are all 
trained by the same method, then r jk could be of importance. In 
this case, r could perhaps be assigned a small constant value for 
jk 
all i and j. If the correlation coefficient is indeed virtually 
zero, then the equations are solvable. 
Second, if it is assumed that the discriminal dispersions are of 
sufficiently similar magnitude, then a i can be assumed to be equal 
for all j and k. This assumption can only be proved by extensive 
testing of the law, by using and not using the assumption that all 
a. are equal. As would be expected, the assumption is more likely 
l. 
to apply when different observers are used for the repeated 
testings. 
By using the first and second assumptions, equation(l) becomes 
lJkj · · · · · · · · · · · · · (2) 
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Since a is a constant, it merely serves as a scaling factor and 
therefore can be ignored. 
• • •• • • • • • • • • • (3) 
Equation (2) is in fact the Thurstone's case V of the law of 
comparative judgement (41). 
If the continuum of interest is, for example, the probability of a 
certain event happening, then the corresponding discriminal scale 
obtained will be the perceived likelihood of an event happening. It 
is suggested by Pontecorvo that the relationship between the 
discriminal separation and the relative probability is logarithmic 
(28). It is felt that the same technique could be used to obtain 
the likelihood of individual scenarios happening as expected by the 
nuclear power plant operator (using the same ranking method), 
valuable information could be obtained on the possible effects of 
stress on the decision making mechanism of the plant operator. 
It must be emphasized that for each of the comparative judgement 
test on a different observer, the decision consistency must be 
monitored (28). 
As the above mentioned ranking method is psychologically based, it 
is not always easy to verify the scale obtained. In the case of 
stress, this may be possible because there exist symptoms of 
stress, which can be monitored. It would be useful to compare the 
findings using physiological criteria with the results from the 
comparison method. The validity of the paired comparison method can 
then be evaluated. 
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Appendix B - OBJ-IV 
B .1. Introduction 
Belel Object Oriented Programming 
Object oriented programming is to data types what structured 
programming is to procedures. In conventional programming, the 
emphasis is placed on procedures. and they can operate on the data 
and there is no provision for the data to refuse the procedure. 
Object oriented programming is to change the emphasis from 
"procedures which operate on data" to "data to which things are 
done". Data are organised into data objects. 
These data objects can communicate with other data objects, but 
only via well defined channels. These objects store information 
about themselves and reply to messages sent to them by other 
objects. These messages may contain requests for information about 
their states or request them to change some aspects of their 
internal state. The store of their internal state is called 
attributes. There are many different implementations of object 
oriented programming and an introduction to the basic ideas of 
programming with objects is provided by (29). 
Bele2 Terminology 
Object: 
This term is used loosely to refer to any data object. In 
general, an object is supposed to represent some real world 
entity, at an appropriate level of abstraction. In OBJ-IV, an 
object denotes a class or type of objects. For example person, 
student, professor, valves etc. 
Frame: 
A frame is a data structure. A frame is consist of a predefined 
set of attributes which characterise an object. In many ways it 
can be considered as identical to an object. It is used mainly to 
denote a particular situation or state. For example, a mammal 
must suckle their young, have fur, and is warm blooded. 
Therefore, a frame for mammal will consist of attributes 
(suckle_young yes) (blood warm) and (fur present). Special 
provisions were made to enable frame matching to be performed and l 
so a special format has been reserved for frames. Frames can be 
regarded as objects and this artificial distinction is made more 
on the ground of ease of programming than real distinctions. 
Instance: 
An instance is a representation of a 
entity, which belongs to a class. For 
instance, so is Mark. Both Peter and Mark 
type person. 
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particular individual 
example Peter is an 
belong to the object 
Message: 
This is how the objects communicate with each other and how the 
outside world communicates with an object. Each object type will 
respond to a set of predefined messages only, and as oppose to a 
procedure being applied to the object, a message is sent to the 
object. 
Method: 
An object uses a method to respond to a particular message. In 
OBJ-IV, a distinction is made between a message which requests 
the information about the internal state of an object and a 
method to which the object can respond. The methods to which a 
class of object can respond is defined by the object definition. 
All instances of the same object type can respond to these 
methods. 
Inheritance: 
If we want to define a new type of object, called professor which 
is a person, it will be rather tedious to have to include all the 
attributes of a person into the definition of the professor. If 
the definition of a person changes, it means the definition of 
the professor will have to be changed as well. It would be very 
convenient if we could simply specify that a professor is a 
person and then add in the special features associated with the 
object type professor. Vhen we want to change the definition.of a 
person, the definition of the professor will be automatically 
updated. The professor will inherit the characteristics of a 
person. 
Multiple Inheritance: 
If we now have three types of objects, professor, person and 
french and we would like to define a new object type called 
french professor, it would be useful if the new class can inherit 
the characteristics associated with the professor and those of 
the french. The new object type french professor will contain all 
the characteristics of the object type french and professor but 
it will also include those features specific to the french 
professors. If the definition of the object type professor is 
changed, the characteristics of the french professor will also be 
updated. Inheritance can be regarded as a "spreadsheet" for 
programming. 
B.l.3 Motivation 
B.l.3.1 Modelling the Decision Processes of A Process Control 
Operator 
Part of the needs of task l06200P of Dynamics and Control Group is 
to construct an expert system which models the decision processes 
of a process plant control operator (25). 
An operator will have to make decisions constantly and the basis of 
his decisions is his perception of the state of the plant. The 
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operator needs to map the current plant state to that of a familiar 
state and once this matching is achieved, he can select the 
relevant operation procedures from his memory store, ie from the 
manual or but he may have acquired the skill during training. He 
will also need to predict the effects of his actions on the plant. 
An operator will- therefore have within his mind a small "internal 
simulator". He will use this simulator to predict the outcome of 
his actions on the plant. However, this "internal simulator" will 
not be similar to the real training simulator because clearly the 
human mind cannot cope with the complexities on such magnitude. 
This "internal simulator" is mostly likely to be constructed using 
qualitative modelling techniques. Yithin the object oriented 
paradigm, individual parts of the plant can be represented as 
objects. The information regarding these objects, and their 
interactions can be easily encapsulated and handled. In particular, 
the structure of the plant can be represented hierarchially, 
employing different levels of abstraction. 
Associated with each scenario or state, is a set of attributes. 
These attributes characterise a particular state. Therefore the 
state of a plant is best represented by a structure which will 
allow a set of attributes to be represented and manipulated. Some 
scenarios may be characterised by a particular sequence of events. 
A sequence of such events is called a script. Recognition of a 
state implies a successful matching of two frames or scripts. Due 
to the fuzzy nature of the real world, it is not expected that a 
perfect match can be achieved. It is clear that a matching 
mechanism which can handle fuzziness is required and it is decided 
that the frame matching method should take advantage of the support 
logic programming capabilites provided by FRIL (30) and (42). 
B.l.3.2 Objective 
The need to apply object oriented programming techniques within the 
support logic programming language FRIL became apparent (25). It 
was therefore decided that a software package that will enable 
object oriented programming techniques to be implemented with ease 
should be developed. This implementation, OBJ-IV is based on an 
object oriented programming package called FLAVOURS within the 
POPLOG environment (33) and FLAVOURS was written in POP11, (34), 
(35), (37). OBJ-IV supports mUltiple inheritance as in FLAVOURS' and 
the algorithm used for selecting the most relevant method is 
identical to that used by FLAVOURS. Details of the inheritance 
protocol can be found in the teach files on FLAVOURS within POPLOG 
(37). Furthermore, OBJ-IV has been extended. Frames and the 
uncertainties associated can be represented within the support 
programming framework of FRIL. A similarity matching algorithm 
utilising support logic was developed. The extension will allow 
sophisticated frame representation to be made. 
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B.2. OBJ-IV Programming Manual 
Defining a Class 
(def_obj X (attrl attr2 attr3 ••••••• » 
X is the name of the class. 
Attrl, attr2 are the attributes associated with class X. 
eg. 
(def_obj person (sex age (health well) profession» 
Attri can either be an ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｾ｡ｭ･＠ or a two member list, 
Ｈｮ｡ｭｾｴｴｲｩ＠ P). Name_attri is the name of the attribute and P is 
the default value of the attribute name_attri. If a value is 
assigned to that attribute in ｾｮ＠ instance of the class, it will 
take precedence over the default value. 
Defining a Method for an Object:-
(def.Jllethod X L) 
X is the class-name and L is the name of the method to which the 
object will respond. If an object is to respond to more than one 
method, each method must be declared separately. 
eg. (def.Jllethod person birthday) 
(def.Jllethod person ill) 
Declaring an Instance 
(generate X Y attrl attr2 •••••• ) 
X is the ｩｮｳｴ｡ｮ｣ｾ｡ｭ･Ｌ＠ with class Y. Attr is a two member list, 
the head of which is the ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｾ｡ｭ･＠ and the tail of which is 
the ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｾｶ｡ｬｵ･Ｎ＠ X should not have been declared before, but 
instances of different class can have the same name, but check-obj 
must be used to select the right instance. 
Updating the Instance Attributes 
Ｈｵｰ､｡ｴｾｯ｢ｪ＠ P (X Y» 
P is the instance-name and X is the ｡ｴｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｾ｡ｭ･＠ and Y the 
attribute_value. The attribute X will be assiged if it is not 
already done so or otherwise it will be overwritten. 
Sending a Message to an Instance (to Obtain the Attribute Value) 
(message ｉｎｓｔａｎｃｅｾａｍｅ＠ ａｔｔｒｉｂｕｔｅｾａｍｅ＠ X Q) 
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The attribute_value of the attribute ATTRIBUTE-NAME will be 
assigned to X. If there is a specific value assigned to the 
attribute of the Instance, Q is spec, otherwise Q is default. If 
there is no specific value for the instance, then X is the default 
value (if one is provided) or not_defined is assigned to X. If the 
attribute-name is not a valid attribute for the class of 
ins tance-name , then not_valid is assigned to X. 
Inheritance - Mixing Classes 
(isa X Y Z ••••• ) 
To define a class X with mixed classes, the mixing must be declared 
before defining its special features using def_obj. 
X is the class-name. Y and Z etc are the superclass of X. The class 
on the left takes precedence over the class on the right. All 
attributes associated with the superclasses Y Z will be available 
to class X. 
Sending a Method to an Instance 
(operate METHOD-NAME (INSTANCE-NAME INPUT) Q OUTPUT) 
The method will be send to the instance INSTANCE-NAME. INPUT is the 
parameters required by the method ｍｅｔｈｏｄｾａｍｅＮ＠ Q is the class whose 
method is chosen and OUTPUT is the output values from the method 
ｍｅｔｈｏｄｾａｍｅＬ＠
Generating a Method 
The method must be in the form of 
(method-Dame class_of_instance (instance-name INPUT) OUTPUT) 
INPUT can be a single value or a list. INPUT is received from 
operate and OUTPUT will be passed to operate. 
Compiling and Executing 
The definitioris of objects, instances and methods should be 
declared as follow: 
«prog) 
Ｈ､･ｦｾｯ｢ｪ＠ ••••••••• ) 
(def-method •••• .- ••••• ) 
(generate ••••••••• ) 
( » 
The declared methods can be placed either before or after the 
declaration. 
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To compile the program, reload file and type: "run prog". 
Predefined Objects 
Two classes for the representation and comparison of frames are 
provided. The class ref_frame allows the attributes which are 
associated with a particular frame to be included and in addition, 
the combinations of these attributes, which characterize the frame 
can be represented. The class frame allows the value of each 
attribute of a frame to be represented. A method for the matching 
of these two frames is provided. A support for the degree of match 
between a frame and the ref-frame will be given as a result of the 
call of the matching function. However, the attributes of which are 
associated with the ref_frame and the test frame must be identical 
otherwise type mismatch will result. 
ReLframe 
Ref_frame consists of two fields, attr_Iist and mini_expert. 
Attr_Iist contains all the attribute names which are associated 
with the ref_frame and each of the attribute defined in attr_Iist 
must be defined in the instance (of class ref_frame). Mini_expert 
contains the combinations of the attributes which characterize the 
ref_frame. 
eg. (generate ref ref_frame 
all the attributes 
defined in attr_ 
list must be 
represented here 
(attr-list (attr_1 attr_2 attr_3 attr_i ••• » 
(attr_i ｶ｡ｬｵｾｩＩ＠
(minLexpert 
(begin 
[
(and attr_i ••• <comp1_1><comp1_i> ••• 
(supp «n1> <p1»» 
«clause» of form: (or <i> <j> ••• <comp2_1><comp2_2> 
») 
integer 
(supp «n2> <p2»» 
«not <j» (supp «n3> <p3»» 
end) 
compound clause, of the following form only :-
(or attr_<j> (attr_<k> value-llew) ••• (not 
attr_<p» ••• attr_<q» 
if a special value, other than the one defined 
Ｈｶ｡ｬｵｾ＼ｫﾻ＠ is required, (attr_<k> value-llew) should be 
used. If attr_<k> only is used, ｶ｡ｬｵｾ＼ｫ＾＠ is assumed. 
compound clause, of the following form only :-
(not attr_<s» 
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<n1> 
<p1> 
necessary support 
possible support 
Bold words are built in words. 
Frame 
Frame consists of field attr_Iist. Attr_Iist contains all the 
attribute names which are associated with the frame and each of the 
attribute defined in attr_Iist must be defined in the instance (of 
class ref_frame). 
eg. (generate ｦｲ｡ｭｾ｡ｭ･＠ frame 
(attr-list (attr_1 attr_2 attr_3 attr_i ••• » 
(attr_i (value1 supp «n1> <p1»» 
all the attributes 
defined in attr_ 
list must be 
represented here 
<i> 
<n1> 
<p1> 
integer 
necessary support 
possible support 
Bold words are built in words. 
To Compare Two Frames 
) 
ﾫ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ FRAME-NAME ｒｅｆｾａｍｅ＠ S» 
compares two frames, frame-Dame which is of class frame and 
ref-Dame which is of class ref_frame. S is the support for the 
match. The knowledge base created is erased once the support is 
calculated. The decision can be traced if required. An option, to 
trace or not is provided at run time. The support logic shell 
fs.frl must be already loaded in the system. 
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B.3. Examples 
B.3.l Example 1 
«progO) 
(def_obj person (name age sex» 
(def-method person birthday) 
% object type person is defined 
% object person can respond to 
% method birthday and 
% print_self 
(def-method person print_self) 
(isa professor person) % professor is a person, ie 
% professor possesses all the 
% characteristics of a person 
(def_obj professor (telefon-no % professor has certain extra 
inaugural_Iecture_subj % characteristics 
subject» 
(def-method professor ｷｲｩｴｾｰ｡ｰ･ｲＩ＠ % professors can respond to 
% the message (request) to 
% ｷｲｩｴｾｰ｡ｰ･ｲ＠
(def-IDethod professor print_self) % professors can respond to 
% the message print_self 
% note that print_self is 
% defined for both person and 
% professor. However, only the 
% most specific method will 
% be used. 
(generate peter person % an instance of person is 
% created. The instance name 
% is peter but the value fo 
% the attribute name of 
(age 22) % instance peter is 
% Peter_Townsley 
(sex male» 
(generate roberts professor % an instance peter of professor is 
% created 
(name Peter-Roberts) % although attribute name is not 
% defined in professor, it is valid 
% because it is declared in the 
% object definition of person and 
% Professor is a person. 
(age ＵＵ｟ｯｮｬｹｾｵ･ｳｳ｟ｳｯｲｲｹ｟ｰｲｯｦＩＨｳ･ｸ＠ male) 
(telefon-no xxxxx) % special characteristics associated 
% with professor only. 
Ｈｩｮ｡ｵｧｵｲ｡ｉＭｬ･｣ｴｵｲｾｳｵ｢ｪ＠ Hierarchical_controI-system) 
(subject control_engineering» ) 
«print_self person (X _) Z) % methods for object type person 
(message X name Z _) 
(p 'I am' X) 
. (pp» 
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«birthday person (X _) Z) 
(message X age Z _) 
(p Happy birthday.) 
(pp) 
(sum Z 1 Y) 
(update_obj X (age Y» ) 
«print_self professor (X _) _) % a more specific for print_self 
% for professor only 
(message X name A _) 
(message X subject B _) 
(p My name is A and 'I' am professor of B) 
(pp» 
ﾫｷｲｩｴｾｰ｡ｰ･ｲ＠ professor (X _) Z) % methods for professor only 
(message X inaugural_Iecture-subj Z _) 
(p 'I will write a paper on' Z)(pp» 
Yhen this example is loaded, the information for the instances 
peter and roberts can be interrogated. Bold type represent outputs 
from program. 
?«message peter name X _)(pp X» 
Peter_Townsley 
?«message peter age X _)(pp X» 
22 
＿ﾫｵｰ､｡ｴｾｯ｢ｪ＠ peter (age 21»(message peter age X _)(pp X» 
21 
?«operate birthday (peter _) __ » 
Happy Birthday. 
?«message peter age X _)(pp X» 
22 
?«operate print_self (peter _) __ » 
My name is peter 
?«operate print_self (roberts _) __ » 
My name is Peter-Roberts and I am professor of control-engineering 
?«delcl print_self 2» % ie the method of print_self for 
% professor is deleted 
?«operate print_self (roberts _) __ » 
My name is roberts. 
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Be3e2 Example 2 
«progl) 
(isa spec-frame frame) % create object type spec_frame, which 
% is a frame 
(def_obj spec-frame (attrl attr2 attr3 attr4 attr5» 
(isa ref_ref_frame spec_frame ref_frame) % create object 
% ref_ref_frame 
(generate spec spec-frame % define an instance of object type 
» 
% spec-frame . 
(attrl (valuel supp (0.9 1») 
(attr2 (value2 supp (0.8 0.9») 
(attr3 (value2 supp (0.4 0.6») 
(attr4 (value3 supp (0.5 0.7») 
(attr5 (value4 supp (0.2 0.5») 
% these attribute 
% values are used 
% as facts in 
% local expert system 
% generated for 
% identification 
% purpose 
(generate ref ref_ref_frame % define instance of object type 
% ref_ref_frame 
(attrl valuel) 
(attr2 value2) 
(attr3 value3) 
(attr4 value4) 
(attr5 value5) 
(mini_expert % a frame is ref if the following rule 
% governing identification is met 
(begin 
) 
(and attr3 attr2 (supp (0.8 0.9») 
(and (or (attrl hello) attr2) attr4 
(supp (0.6 0.9») 
(or attrl attr4 (supp (0.5 0.7») 
(and (or (not attr3) attrl) attr2 
(supp (0.4 0.7») 
«not attr5) (supp (0.6 1») 
end) 
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B.3.3 Example 3 
% Example of how different natural language descriptors can be 
% modelled using fuzzy sets 
/* 
(high [0.4:0 0.5:0.4 0.8:1 1:1 1.01:0]) 
(low [-0.99:0 0:0.5 0.2:1 0.45:1 0.5:0.4 0.6:0.1 0.7:0]) 
(little [-0.99:0 0.3:1 0.5:0.3 0.6:0 0.7:0]) 
Ｈｾｬｯｴ＠ [0.3:0 0.6:0.5 0.7:0.9 0.8:1 1:1 1.01:0]) 
(two [0:0 2:1 2.01:0]) 
(none [-0.99:0 0:1 0.1:0 1:0]) 
(yes [0.99:0 1:1 1.01:0]) 
*/ 
«prog) 
(isa mammal frame) % create object type mammal, which is a 
% frame 
(def_obj mammal (intelligence hair size % define special 
legs hands appetite % features particular 
ｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ tail» % to mammal 
(isa mammaI-ref mammal ref_frame) % mammaI-ref is a mammal 
% and a ref_frame 
(generate human mammal_ref % define an instance of object 
% type mammal_ref, called human 
» 
(intelligence high) 
(hair little) 
(size medium) 
(legs two) 
(hands yes) 
(appetite omnivore) 
Ｈｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ small) 
(tail none) 
(mini_expert 
(begin 
% this is the set of attributes 
% by which a typical mammal is 
% defined and the values of these 
% attributes are used in the local 
% expert system generated for frame 
% matching purpose 
(and intelligence tail 
(supp «0.8 1)(0.0 0.35»» 
(and hands 
legs (or appetite (appetite herbivore) ) 
(supp «0.4 1)(0.2 0.6»» 
(and hair size legs ｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠
(supp «0.4 1)(0.2 0.6»» 
(and tail (supp «0.8 1)(0.0 0.2»» 
end) 
(generate Peter mammal % define an instance of object 
% Peter, which is a mammal 
(intelligence (high supp (0.8 1») 
(hair (little supp (0.9 1») 
(size (medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 1») 
(appetite (herbivore supp (1 1») 
(nose-size (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (none supp (1 1») 
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% these attribute 
% values are used as 
% facts in the local 
% expert system 
% generated for 
% identification 
% purpose 
) 
(generate monkey mammal % define an instance of object monkey, 
» 
% which is a mammal 
(intelligence (medium supp (1 1») 
(hair Ｈｾｬｯｴ＠ supp (1 1») 
(size (medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 1») 
(appetite (omnivore supp (1 1») 
Ｈｮｯｳｾｩｺ･＠ (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (yes supp (1 1») 
Vhen this example is loaded, the information for the references 
human, and instances Peter and monkey can be interrogated. Both 
instances, Peter and monkey can be compared with the reference 
human and a degree of support for each instance being a good match 
for the "concept will be provided. 
Bold type represents outputs from program. 
?«run prog» 
yes 
＿ﾫ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ monkey human X)(pp X» 
"bI2 
Investigate matching criteria - (yIn)? n 
(0.4 1) 
There is a miniimun support of 0.4 for a monkey to be a human. 
?«compare_frame Peter human X)(pp X» 
Investigate matching criteria - (yin)? n 
(0.8 1) 
There is a minimun support of 0.8 for Peter to be a human. 
＿ﾫ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ Peter hman X)(pp X» 
Investigate matching criteria - (yin)? y % using the FRIL 
% support shell for 
% checking of 
% inferencing 
to return to program, enter b at ? 
Current goal is (Shuman match) % a frame is compared with 
% a reference frame, a local 
Shell level ($human) 
% expert system, for the question 
% ＨＤｾａｈｅ＠ match) is created 
Option ? (h for help) : s (see FRIL manual or detail) 
Clause 1 of rule Shuman is: % first way of defning a human 
«$human match) 
($intelligence high) 
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($tail none» : «0.8 1) (0 0.35» 
Inferences from body of clause 1 of Shuman are: 
«$intelligence high) 
($tail none)} : (0.8 1) 
Inerences from clause 1 of Shuman are: 
($huamn match) : (0.64 1) % support from usiing the first 
% viewpoint of "human" 
Clause 2 of rule Shuman is: % second defintiion of human 
«$human match) 
($hands yes) 
($legs two) 
(or ($appetite ominvore) 
($appetite herbivore») : «0.4 1) (0.2 0.6» 
Inferences from body of clause 2 of Shuman are: 
«$hands yes) 
($legs two) 
(or ($appetite ominvore) 
($appetite herbivore») : (1 1) 
Inferences from clause 2 of Shuman are : 
($human match) : (0.4 1) % support from using the second 
% defintion 
Clause 3 of rule Shuman is: % third definition for human 
«$human match) 
($hair little) 
($size medium) 
($legs two) 
ＨＤｮｯｳｾｩｺ･＠ small» : «0.4 1) (0.2 0.6» 
Inferences from body of clause 3 of Shuman are : 
«$hair little) 
($size medium) 
($legs two) 
ＨＤｮｯｳｾｩｺ･＠ small» L (0.9 1) 
Inferences from clause 3 of Shuman are: 
($human match) : (0.38 1) % support from using the third 
% definition 
Clause 4 of rule Shuman is : % fourth defintion for human 
«$human match) 
(tail none» : (0.8 1) (0 0.2» 
Inferences from body of clause 4 of Shuman are: 
($tail none) : (1 1) 
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Inferences from clause 4 of Shuman are : 
($human match): (0.8 1) % support from using the fourth 
% definition 
Shell level ($human) 
Option ? (h for help) b 
Completed nvestigations on goal ($human match) 
Backing up a level: 
(0.8 1) % the final support from combining supports obtained 
% through different defintions for human 
yes 
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B.4. Program Listings 
B.4.1 Program OBJ-IV.frl 
?«lload (object frame2 fs» 
(p The 'OBJ-IV' is now loaded)(pp) 
(pp) 
(p There is a demonstration program, called Example1.frl)(pp) 
(p To load, type "load example1")(pp) 
(pp) 
(pp) . 
(p For a demonstration on HOOP" , type "run progO") 
(pp) 
(p For a demonstration on frame representation and frame 
matching,) 
(pp) 
(p type "run prog1" and follow instructions in the documentation) 
(pp) 
(p "OBJ-IV")(pp» 
B.4.2 Program Object.frl - This is the core program. 
************************************************************* 
* * 
* Pstart is the Initialising Procedure. If yes, fs.frl and * 
* list_proc.frl will be reloaded. * 
* * 
************************************************************* 
*1 
«pstart) 
(p reload file "ownsys.frl" - "yIn" ?) 
(flush stdin) 
(getb stdin 00) 
(if (eq 00 121) 
«reload ownsys » 
«dum» » 
?«pstart» 
1* 
«root def (level) » 
«root method (printself) » 
«printself root) 
(p "<" root ")" "(level 0)"» 
*1 
1* 
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**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Def_obj declares a class X, with allowed attributes L. L is * 
* a list of the attribute names. Default values can be * 
* embedded. (see related document on syntax). It creates an * 
* two predicates: (X def •••• ) and (X precedence •••• ). * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«def_obj X L) 
(addcl «odict X» ) 
(addcl «X def L» ) 
(if (cl «X precedence XIQ» ) 
«dum» 
«dum» 
«if (cl «X precedenceIR» ) 
«delcl «X precedenceIR» ) 
(addcl «X precedence XIR» » 
«addcl «X precedence X» » » » 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Generate creates an instance X of class Y, with attributes * 
* Z. If no specific attribute is given, instance can assume * 
* the default value of the class Y. It generates internal Fril * 
* clause (casel X Y ••••• ) * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«generate X YIZ) 
(append (casel X Y) Z P) 
(addcl (P» ) 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* check-obj gives the class (type) of the instance X as L. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«check-obj X L) 
(casel X LIP» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Update_obj changes the associated value of attribute X to Y. * 
* It can only change one attribute at a time. It operates on * 
* the internal clause (casel X •••••• ). It checks that the * 
* attribute X is a valid one as defined in the class, internal * 
* clause (X def ••• ). If no specific value is assigned to the * 
* attribute, then it is appended to the internal clause (case) * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
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«update_obj P (X Y) ) 
(casel P Q IR) 
(show_fields Q Z) 
(orr «member X Z» 
«member (X YY) Z» ) 
(orr «delete (X T) R Rl) 
(append «X Y» Rl R2» 
«append «X Y» R R2» ) 
(delcl «casel P QIR» ) 
(addcl «casel P Q R2» » 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Def-IDethod defines the allowed method for class OBJ. It gen- * 
* erates an internal clause (OBJ methods ( •.•. ». * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«def-IDethod OBJ METHOD) 
(orr «cl «OBJ methods X» ) 
(member METHOD X» 
«cl «OBJ methods X» ) 
(append X (METHOD) Y) 
(delcl «OBJ methods X» ) 
(addcl «OBJ methods Y» » 
«addcl «OBJ methods (METHOD) » » » 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Operate means to execute the METHOD. It checks the precedence* 
* list, and select the most specific method. The method is * 
* operated on instance CASE, with P as input to method and S * 
* as output. Q is the class whose method is chosen. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«operate METHOD (CASE P) Q S) 
(casel CASE OBJIZ) 
(OBJ precedence Y) 
Ｈ｣ｨｯｯｳｾ･ｴｨｯ､＠ METHOD Y Q (CASE P) S» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Choose-IDethod selects the most specific method to use. It * 
* checks the precedence list and fires the method with the * 
* higher precedence. Method must be defined as * 
* (METHOD CLASS (INSTANCE INPUT) OUTPUT) * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«choose-IDethod METHOD () no_defined-IDethod (CASE P) undefined» 
«choose-IDethod METHOD Y Q (CASE P) S) 
(eq Y (AlB) ) 
(orr «A methods L) 
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(member METHOD L) 
(METHOD A (CASE P) S) 
(eq A Q» 
«choose-method METHOD B Q (CASE P) S» ) ) 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Message returns the attribute value associated with the * 
* attribute name. It also indicates whether the attribute * 
* value returned is a value specifically assigned to the * 
* Instance or a default value to the class. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«message CASE FIELD X spec) 
(casel CASE OBJIZ) 
(member (FIELD X) Z» 
«message CASE FIELD X default) 
(casel CASE OBJIZ) 
(show_fields OBJ L) 
/* 
(orr «member (FIELD X) L» 
«member FIELD L) 
(eq X unknown» 
«eq X not_valid» » 
«isa X Y) 
(addcl «odict X» ) 
(orr «cl «X precedenceIQ» ) 
*/ 
(p X is already defined as Q» 
«cl «Y precedenceIZ» ) 
(append (X precedence X) Z Zl) 
(addcl (Zl) » » 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Isa defines a class X, which is a subclass of Y etc. It * 
* creates a updated precedence list, using the priority of * 
* left up to joint strategy as used in FLAVOURS in POPll. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«isa XIR) 
(eq R (AlB» 
(initial (AlB) LA) 
Ｈｭ｡ｫｾｰｲ･｣･､･ｮ｣･＠ B LA LB Y) 
(append (X precedence) Y K) 
(addcl (K) » 
«initial (AlB) LA) 
(A precedence\LA» 
/* 
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*************************************************************** 
* * 
* Make_precedence creats the precedence list due to the 
* declaration. It locates the first common class in the 
* hierarchy list, and then partition the lists into two 
* sections. They are then appended and a new precedence 
* is produced. 
* 
isa 
list 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*************************************************************** 
*/ 
ﾫｭ｡ｫｾｰｲ･｣･､･ｮ｣･＠ () LA _ LA» 
«make_precedence (BIC) LA LB LF3) 
(B precedencelLB) 
(member XX LA) 
(member XX LB) 
(I) 
(partition XX LA LAl LA2) 
(partition XX LB LBl LB2) 
(append LAl LBl LF1) 
(append LFl LA2 LF2) 
Ｈｭ｡ｫｾｰｲ･｣･､･ｮ｣･＠ C LF2 Z LF3» 
ﾫｭ｡ｫｾｰｲ･｣･､･ｮ｣･＠ (BIC) LA LB LF3) 
(B precedencelLB) 
(append LA LB LF2) 
(make_precedence C LF2 Z LF3» 
/* 
************************************************************** 
* * 
* Partition, part and rappend deals divides the list into * 
* two ｳ･ｰ｡ｲｾｴ･＠ parts where there is a common class. Since * 
* append must have the first list instantiated, rap pend is * 
* written to allow the first part of the list to be joined * 
* on to give a new list. * 
* * 
************************************************************** 
*/ 
«partition X (AlB) Ll L2) 
(part X (A B) L2) 
(rappend Ll L2 (AlB») 
«rappend X Y Z) 
(reverse Z Zl) 
(reverse Y Yl) 
(append Yl Xl Zl) 
(reverse Xl X» 
«part X () () » 
«part X (AlB) L2) 
(if (eq X A) 
/* 
«eq L2 (XIB») 
«part X B L2» » 
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**************************************************************** 
* * 
* Show_fields obtain all the allowed fields for the object. * 
* It will catenate all the valid fields inherited from the * 
* superclasses. The clause (X def ••• ) for each superclass is * 
* checked. * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
/* 
«show_fields OBJ Q) 
(OBJ precedencelY) 
(allowerl-fields Y () Q) 
(p fields defined for OBJ are) 
(pp) 
(p Q) 
(pp» 
*/ 
«show_fields OBJ Q) 
(OBJ precedencelY) 
(allowed_fields Y () Q» 
«allowed_fields () P P» 
«allowerl-fields (AlB) P Q) 
(A def L) 
(append P L R) 
(allowed_fields B R Q» 
«run X) 
(clear prog) 
(?«X» » 
«clear prog) 
(odict X) 
(delcl «X defIY» ) 
(fail» 
«clear prog) 
(odict X) 
(delcl «X precedenceIY» ) 
(fail» 
«clear prog) 
(odict X) 
(delcl «X methods IX» ) 
(fail» 
«clear prog) 
(kill easel) 
(kill odict) 
(fail» 
«clear prog) 
(def_obj frame (» 
(def_obj ref_frame (mini_expert) » 
/* 
B.4.3 Program Frame2.frl - Frame Hatching 
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**************************************************************** 
* * 
* ｧ･ｮ･ｲ｡ｴｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ｟ｳｹｳｴ･ｭ＠ takes the list from the attribute * 
* mini_expert of FRAME-NAME which is of the type ref_frame and * 
* pass each member of the list to be processed by the * 
* predicate process_clause. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
ﾫｧ･ｮ･ｲ｡ｴｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ｟ｳｹｳｴ･ｭ＠ (end) ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅﾻ＠
ﾫｧ･ｮ･ｲ｡ｴｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ｟ｳｹｳｴ･ｭ＠ (XIY) FRAME-NAME) 
(process_clause FRAME-NAME X) 
Ｈｧ･ｮ･ｲ｡ｴｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ｟ｳｹｳｴ･ｭ＠ Y ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅﾻ＠
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* process_clause generate one bundle element from the given * 
* list. Each list can be of the following forms (andIY) or * 
* (orIY). * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«process_clause FRAME-NAME (andIY» 
(anding FRAME-NAME Y () Q» 
«process_clause FRAME-NAME (orIY» 
(oring FRAME-NAME Y CLAUSE» 
«process_clause FRAME-NAME «not X)IY» 
(anding FRAME-NAME -«not X)IY) () CLAUSE» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* oring and ｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ generates a clause which involves or. * 
* The terminating condition is either the end of the list (ie * 
* the or is nested withing an AND) or «supp Q» (ie or is the * 
* beginning of the list). ｐｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ takes the number of the * 
* attribute, look it up in the attr_Iist, and appends all the * 
* ors together to form a clausel of the form (or «atom» ••• ) * 
* if it is terminated by encountering a (). Otherwise if it is * 
* terminated by encountering «supp Q» then a clause * 
* «$FRAME-NAME match)(clausel»: Q is added, which forms part * 
* of the local expert system. The clause added will be part of * 
* bundle for ($FRAME-NAME match). * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«oring ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ (XIY) CLAUSE) 
(pre_oring FRAME-NAME (XIY) CLAUSE (») 
ﾫｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ FRAME-NAME () CLAUSEl FIX) 
(append (or) FIX CLAUSE1» 
«pre_oring FRAME-NAME «supp Q» CLAUSEl FIX) 
(append (or) FIX CLAUSE2) 
(add_dollar ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ ｄｏｌｌａｒＭｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅＩ＠
(append ﾫｄｏｌｌａｒＭｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ match» (CLAUSE2) CLAUSE1) 
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(addcl CLAUSEl : Q» 
ﾫｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ «not (SS Q»IY) CLAUSE FIX) 
. (add_dollar SS DOLLAR-SS) 
(append FIX «not DOLLAR-SS Q» SPIT) 
(pre_oring ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ Y CLAUSEl SPIT» 
«pre_oring ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ «not SS)IY) CLAUSEl FIX) 
(message ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ SS Q _) 
Ｈ｡､ｾ､ｯｬｬ｡ｲ＠ SS DOLLAR-SS) 
(append FIX «not DOLLAR-SS Q» SPIT) 
Ｈｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ Y CLAUSEl SPIT» 
ﾫｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ «SS Q)IY) CLAUSEl FIX) 
(add_dollar SS DOLLAR-SS) 
(append FIX «DOLLAR-SS Q» SPIT) 
(pre_oring ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ Y CLAUSEl SPIT» 
ﾫｰｲｾｯｲｩｮｧ＠ ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ (SSIY) CLAUSEl FIX) 
(message ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ SS Q _) 
(add_dollar SS DOLLAR-SS) 
(append FIX «DOLLAR-SS Q» SPIT) 
(pre_oring ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ Y CLAUSEl SPIT» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* anding takes a list and form a clause which "ands" all the * 
* predicates together. It is always terminated by encountering * 
* «supp Q». It looks up the Xth attribute in the attr_list, * 
* and its associated value. Each of these attributes are * 
* joined together via "and". If the element is (not N) or * 
* (orIY), it performs the not or use oring. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«anding FRAHE-NAME «supp (X Y») P Q) 
Ｈ｡､ｾ､ｯｬｬ｡ｲ＠ ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ ｄｏｌｌａｒＭｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅＩ＠
(append ﾫｄｏｌｌａｒＭｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ match» P Q) 
(addcl Q : (X Y) » 
«anding FRAME-NAME «not A)IXT) P Q) 
(message ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ A QV _) 
(add-dollar A DOLtAR-!) . 
(append (not DOLtAR-!) (QV) DUMP) 
(append P (DUMP) R) 
(anding ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ XT R Q» 
«anding FRAME-NAME «orIY)IXT) P Q) 
(oring ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ Y CLAUSE) 
(append P (CLAUSE) R) 
(anding ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ XT R Q» 
«anding ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ (AIT) P Q) 
(message ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ A QV _) 
(add_dollar A DOLLAR-A) 
(append (DOLtAR-!) (QV) DUMP) 
(append P (DUMP) R) 
(anding ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ T R Q» 
?«def_obj frame (») 
?«def_obj ref_frame (mini_expert») 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* make_database takes a frame, which must be of type frame. * 
* From the attr_Iist of the frame, a local set of facts are * 
* generated. These clauses are of the form «$attr value»: Q * 
* It uses the sub predicate process_attr, which the attr_Iist * 
* as argument. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
ﾫｭ｡ｫｾ､｡ｴ｡｢｡ｳ･＠ ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ A-LIST) 
(check-obj ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ L) 
(L precedence IX) 
(member frame X) 
(show_fields LA-LIST) 
(process_attr A-LIST FRAME-MAME» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* make_expert takes a frame of type ref_frame and generate a * 
* localised expert system using generate_expert_system. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
ﾫｭ｡ｫｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ＠ ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅＩ＠
(check-obj ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ L) 
(L precedencelX) 
(member ref_frame X) 
(message ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ mini_expert (beginIXT) _) 
Ｈｧ･ｮ･ｲ｡ｴｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ｟ｳｹｳｴ･ｭ＠ XT FRAME-MAME» 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* ｰｲｯ｣･ｳｳｾｴｴｲ＠ takes the attr_list and obtain the support and * 
* value for each attribute. An internal clause in the form of * 
* «$attr value): Q is generated for each attribute in the * 
* list. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
«process_attr () F» 
«process_attr (XIT) FRAME-MAME) 
(message ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ X (V supp Q) _) 
(add_dollar X Y) 
(addcl «Y V» : Q) 
(process_attr T ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅﾻ＠
/* 
193 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* multi_kill takes a list of predicate names as argument and * 
* remove all the named predicates in the database. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*1 
ﾫｭｵｬｴｩｾｩｬｬ＠ (») 
ﾫｭｵｬｴｩｾｩｬｬ＠ (XIT» 
(kill X) 
Ｈｭｵｬｴｩｾｩｬｬ＠ T» 
1* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ takes two frame names as arguments. These two * 
* frames must have the same attr_Iist defined. Otherwise type * 
* mismatch will result. ｃｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ uses make_expert to * 
* generate a local mini_expert system from the the REF-FRAME * 
* which is of the type ref_frame. ｍ｡ｫｾ､｡ｴ｡｢｡ｳ･＠ is used to * 
* generate the localised database from ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ which is of * 
* the type frame. If reasoning is required, the FRIL support * 
* logic shell is invoked, ie fs must be already loaded. When * 
* control is returned to ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ (after the shell is * 
* terminated using b), the support for the clause ($ref match) * 
* is returned and then all local database and $ref are deleted * 
* and the support for clause «$REF_FRAME match» is given as * 
* S. The support for «$REF_FRAME match» gives an indication * 
* of how similar the frame in question is similar to * 
* the REF_FRAME. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*1 
ﾫ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｦｲ｡ｭ･＠ ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ REF-FRAME S) 
(!) 
Ｈｭ｡ｫｾ･ｸｰ･ｲｴ＠ REF-FRAME) 
Ｈｭ｡ｫｾ､｡ｴ｡｢｡ｳ･＠ ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ A-LIST) 
(add_dollar REF_FRAME DOLLAR-REF-FRAME) 
(p investigate matching criteria - "(yIn)? ") 
(get stdin X) 
(name (X) XN) 
(!) 
(if (eq XN y) 
«p "to return to program," enter b at 7) 
(fs (DOLLAR-REF_FRAME match») 
«dum»)' 
(supp_query «DOLLAR-REF_FRAME match» S) 
(kill DOLLAR-REF-FRAME) 
(add_dollar_list A-LIST DOLLAR-A-LIST (» 
(multi-kill DOLLAR-A-LIST» 
«compare_frame ｆｒａｍｾａｍｅ＠ REF-FRAME not_valid) 
(p ｆｒａｍｅｾａｍｅ＠ and REF-NAME are not of same type» 
1* 
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«new_error 400 support ｾ･ｳｳ｡ｧ･＠ E L S) 
( ! ) 
(pp E) 
(pp L) 
(abort» 
«new_error NAB C D E) 
(pp NAB C D E) 
(p second branch) 
(pp) 
(error NAB C DE» 
*1 
1*' 
**************************************************************** 
* 
* find_order gives the pth element of list (AlB) as Y 
* 
* 
* 
* 
**************************************************************** 
*1 
«find_order 1 (AlB) A» 
«finrl-order P (A B) Y) 
(sum Q 1 P) 
(find_order Q BY» 
1* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* add-dollar_list takes a list of strings and add $ before * 
* each string. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*1 
«add_dollar_list () Y Y» 
«add_dollar_list (XIT) Y Z) 
(add_dollar X DOLLAR-X) 
(append Z (DOLLAR-X) Zl) 
(add_dollar_list T Y Zl» 
1* 
**************************************************************** 
* * 
* add_dollar takes a string as argument and adds $ to the * 
* string. * 
* * 
**************************************************************** 
*1 
«add_dollar X Y) 
(name XN X) 
1* 
(append (36) XN XXN) 
(name XXN Y» 
«prog) 
(isa mammal frame) 
(def_obj mammal (intelligence hair size 
legs hands appetite 
nose_size tail» 
(isa mammal_ref mammal ref_frame) 
(generate human ｭ｡ｭｭ｡ｾｲ･ｦ＠
(intelligence high) 
(hair little) 
» 
(size medium) 
(legs two) 
(hands yes) 
(appetite omnivore) 
Ｈｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ small) 
(tail none) 
(mini_expert 
(begin 
(and intelligence tail (supp «0.8 1)(0.0 0.35»» 
(and hands 
legs (or appetite (appetite herbivore) ) 
(supp «0.4 1)(0.2 0.6»» 
(and hair size legs ｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ (supp «0.4 1)(0.2 0.6»» 
(and tail (supp «0.8 1)(0.0 0.2»» 
end) 
(generate Peter mammal 
) 
(intelligence (high supp (0.8 1») 
(hair (little supp (0.9 1») 
(size (medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 1») 
(appetite (herbivore supp (1 1») 
Ｈｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (none supp (1 1») 
(generate monkey mammal 
» 
(intelligence (medium supp (1 1») 
(hair Ｈｾｬｯｴ＠ supp (1 1») 
(size (medium supp (1 1») 
(legs (two supp (1 1») 
(hands (yes supp (1 1») 
(appetite (omnivore supp (1 1») 
Ｈｮｯｳｾｳｩｺ･＠ (small supp (1 1») 
(tail (yes supp (1 1») 
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«prog1) 
1* 
(isa spec_frame frame) 
(def_obj spec_frame (attr1 attr2 attr3 attr4 attrS» 
(isa ref_ref_frame spec_frame ref_frame) 
(generate spec spec_frame 
(attr1 (value1 supp (0.9 1») 
(attr2 (value2 supp (0.8 0.9») 
(attr3 (value3 supp (0.4 0.6») 
(attr4 (value4 supp (O.S 0.7») 
(attrS (valueS supp (0.2 O.S»» 
(generate ref ref_ref_frame 
» 
(attr1 value1) 
(attr2 value2) 
(attr3 value3) 
(attr4 value4) 
(attrS valueS) 
(mini_expert 
) 
(begin 
(and attr3 attr2 (supp (0.8 0.9») 
(and (or (attr1 hello) attr2) attr4 (supp (0.6 
(or attr1 attr4 (supp (O.S 0.7») 
(and (or (not attr3) attr1) attr2 (supp (0.4 O. 
«not attrS) (supp (0.6 1») 
end) 
(high [0.4:0 0.5:0.4 0.8:1 1:1 1.01:0]) 
(low [-0.99:0 O:O.S 0.2:1 0.4S:1 0.S:0.4 0.6:0.1 0.7:0]) 
(little [-0.99:0 0.3:1 0.S:0.3 0.6:0 0.7:0]) 
Ｈｾｬｯｴ＠ [0.3:0 0.6:0.S 0.7:0.9 0.8:1 1:1 1.01:0]) 
(two [0:0 2:1 2.01:0]) 
(none [-0.99:0 0:1 0.1:0 1:0]) 
(yes [0.99:0 1:1 1.01:0]) 
*1 
B.4.4 Demonstration Program - Examplel.frl 
/* 
**************************************************************** 
* 
* 
* 
Demonstration Program * 
* 
* 
**************************************************************** 
*/ 
/* 
Program - Examplel.frl 
*7 
«progO) 
(def_obj person (name age sex» 
(def-method person birthday) 
(def-method person print_self) 
(isa professor person) 
(def_obj professor (telefon-no ｩｮ｡ｵｧｵｲ｡ｬ｟ｬ･｣ｴｵｲｾｳｵ｢ｪ＠ subject» 
(def-method professor write_paper) 
(def-method professor print_self) 
(generate peter person (name Peter_Townsley)(age 22)(sex male» 
(generate roberts professor (name Peter-Roberts)(age 55)(sex male) 
Ｈｴ･ｬ･ｦｯｾｯ＠ xxxxx) 
Ｈｩｮ｡ｵｧｵｲ｡ｉＭｉ･｣ｴｵｲｾｵ｢ｪ＠ HierarchicaI-control_system 
(subject control_engineering» ) 
«print_self person (X _) Z) 
(message X name Z _) 
(p My name is X) 
(pp» 
«birthday person (X _) Z) 
(message X age Z _) 
(p Happy birthday.) 
(pp) 
(sum Z 1 Y) 
Ｈｵｰ､｡ｴｾｯ｢ｪ＠ X (age Y» ) 
«print_self professor (X _) _) 
(message X name A _) 
(message X subject B _) 
(p My name is A and 'I' am professor of B) 
(pp» 
ﾫｷｲｩｴｾｰ｡ｰ･ｲ＠ professor (X _) Z) 
(message X ｩｮ｡ｵｧｵｲ｡ＱＭｬ･｣ｴｵｲｾｳｵ｢ｪ＠ Z _) 
(p 'I will write a paper on' Z)(pp» 
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